Small-holder credit: Roles of farmers, government and private sector by Gordon, Ann
Small-holder eredib roles of fatnttJts, government and ,:pdvate see:tor 
Final ·techn,i~al report by Ann Gurdon, Natural R:ts0nr.ce.s: Institute 
August 1999 
DFID Crop Post-Harvest Research Programme Project R7197 
NRI Project A0786 
Report No. 2445 
Contents 
page 
Acknowledgements 
List of abbreviations 
Executive summary 1 
Background 2 
Project purpose 4 
Research activities 4 
Outputs 6 
Contribution of outputs 18 
References 20 
Annexes 
1. List of other reports submitted to CPHP with final technical report 
2. Journal article submitted to Savings and Development 
3. Text ofNRI Policy Series publication, in press 
4. Text of NRI Development Issues publication, in press· 
5. Shorter article, example of submission to eg Spore, ZFU 
6. Paper presented at OPM workshop, July 1999 
Acknowledgements 
The author and project leader is extremely grateful to Andrew Goodland of NRI for his 
important role in the field research for this project. However, nothing would have been 
achieved without the willing collaboration and contributions made by numerous people 
working in the development community, in commerce, in government and in research in 
Zimbabwe, Uganda, and in the UK. Above all, however, we are indebted to the rural 
communities who shared their ideas and experience with us, with generosity, patience, 
and good humour. 
This publication is an output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing 
countries. The views expressed here are not necessarily those ofDFID. (R7197 Crop 
Post-harvest Research Programme). 
List of abbreviations 
CDO 
CFC 
CPHP 
CPP 
DFID 
FAQ 
IFPRI 
ISNAR 
NGO 
NR 
NRI 
NRPAD 
ODI 
OPM 
RNR 
RNRKS 
UGEA 
Cotton Development Organisation, Uganda 
Common Fund for Commodities 
Crop Post Harvest Programme (RNRKS, DFID) 
Crop Protection Programme (RNRKS, DFID) 
Department for International Development, UK 
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
International Food Policy and Research Institute 
International Service for National Agricultural Research 
non-governmental organisation 
natural resources 
Natural Resources Institute 
Natural Resources Policy and Advisory Department (ofDFID's 
predecessor, the Overseas Development Administration) 
Overseas Development Institute 
Oxford Policy Management 
renewable natural resources 
Renewable Natural Resources Knowledge Strategy 
Uganda Ginners and Exporters Association 
Executive Summary 
The project purpose was to develop and promote efficient and effective crop marketing 
and credit systems. It focused on the use of credit to improve access by resource-poor 
fanners to productivity-enhancing purchased farm inputs. Two cotton input credit 
schemes were studied in detail, both still in a state of evolution and development. Each 
has coverage far in excess of any other formal sources of credit available to smallholders 
(60,000 farmers in Zimbabwe and 300,000 farmers in Uganda). They are particularly 
interesting, moreover, because both are private sector initiatives, and the Uganda 
example has especially strong poverty focus. 
The project activities comprised field work in Uganda and Zimbabwe, focusing on the 
cotton credit schemes and potential application in other sectors, workshops, and the 
production and distribution of dissemination outputs. 
Although very different, both credit schemes studied have novel features. The cotton 
schemes in Zimbabwe are almost state-of-the-art examples of best practice in lending to 
smallholders, using a number of measures to facilitate and coerce repayment by 
smallholders. The programme is strictly commercially-run, and focuses on the more 
productive farmers. By comparison, the Uganda programme seems clumsy and 
paternalistic, with the cotton ginners taking responsibility for an input loan, and inputs 
distributed "free" to farmers. Costs are recouped via a uniform deduction in the price 
fanners receive for their seed cotton, but the ginners are contractually responsible for 
repayment, with each contributing on the basis of individual volumes ginned. Yet, the 
scheme has many advantages. It promotes cotton production, where fanners do not have 
sufficient cash to pay for inputs and where individual fanner loan programmes are 
unlikely to work (earlier attempts at this resulted in farmers simply selling their crop to 
other ginners to avoid repayment). Moreover, although input "hand-outs" are not the 
best way to promote their efficient use by farmers, the programme does have extremely 
large coverage amongst resource-poor farmers. (In Uganda, less risk-averse, better-
resourced farmers would not choose to grow cotton). 
The research and the workshops made an extremely timely contribution to current 
debate in b~th countries where, for different reasons, smallholder access to purchased 
inputs is receiving a lot of attention. The workshops also highlighted a number of other 
measures to improve access to inputs - both complements and alternatives to credit. 
The work has generated a good deal of interest in the two countries concerned, and 
elsewhere. In addition to the planned distribution of dissemination outputs, there have 
been unsolicited requests for presentations and/or copies of relevant publications, and 
the research has already been cited in other work. Extra dissemination outputs have 
been produced. 
However, the main channel for uptake of results is through contribution to policy 
development in Uganda, Zimbabwe and elsewhere (for instance, by informing the 
Programme for the Modernisation of Agriculture, in Uganda), and by the development 
of new projects and initiatives which build on the research. The prospects for this 
appear promising in both countries, with new work under discussion with DFID, F AO 
and in-country collaborators. 
Background 
The research described here sought to investigate the conditions under which the private 
sector will extend credit to smallholders in Africa. In particular, it explored scope for 
co-operation between traders or processors to achieve quasi-crop purchase monopolies 
(such that farmers cannot avoid repayment of input loans) and the use of other 
mechanisms (including group lending, and private/public co-operation) in support of 
sustainable farm input credit schemes. 
Historically, increases in agricultural output in sub-Saharan Africa were largely 
attributable to the expansion of cultivated area - through destruction of forest and 
cultivation of increasingly marginal areas. However, the scope to convert new lands 
has declined and it is now widely accepted that further production increases can only 
come (with a few exceptions) from more intensive production (see for example, 
Badiane and Delgado, 1995, Marter and Gordon, 1996, Lipton, 1988). 
Whilst some intensification is achievable using farmers' own inputs, there is also an 
important role for purchased inputs - particularly improved seed and inorganic 
fertiliser. Prior to the economic reforms that have swept through most of Africa in the 
last 10-15 years, many farmers had better access to purchased inputs than they do now 
(though this is not to imply that this situation was sustainable or problem-free). For 
instance: 
• over-valued exchange rates made imported inputs seem less expensive 
• commodity marketing boards often operated crop purchase monopolies 
which made it relatively easy to collect on input loans advanced to farmers 
• credit and inputs were often subject to public sector subsidies, and 
• governments often provided agricultural marketing, extension and input 
services. 
The adjustment vision was that an appropriate enabling environment, with less state 
intervention and economic distortion, would unleash the commercial sector - such 
that farmers would benefit from access to new markets and privately provided 
services. Yet the reality is that commercial activity has been highly selective and 
often disappointing. Those farmers most in need of productivity increases are those 
least able to pay for inputs. Devaluation, a more limited sphere of state activity, and 
tighter controls on loan programmes, have reduced access to inputs. 
"The nature of the challenge is not so much one of prices, although relative 
price changes have undoubtedly exacerbated the difficulties in recent years. 
Rather, it is that the majority of smallholders cannot afford to purchase 
adequate quantities of seasonal inputs on a cash basis at the start of the 
production season" (Poulton et al., 1998, p42). 
There has been considerable work on issues affecting smallholder access to credit -
but significantly less focused on private sector mechanisms for credit within the 
current liberalised market context in sub-Saharan Africa. There has, nonetheless, 
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been an expectation that the private sector would fill the gap left by the withdrawal of 
the public sector - and provide more efficient cost-effective services. However, there 
is growing concern and evidence that in Africa's capital-scarce economies, there are a 
number of factors (including risk and high transactions costs) which inhibit private 
sector investment in the agricultural sector. Policy-makers are increasingly stressing 
the need for a judicious mix of state and private intervention - where the former works 
in support of the latter: 
"Development - economic, social, and sustainable - without an effective state 
is impossible. It is increasingly recognised that an effective state - not a 
minimal one - is central to economic and social development, but more as 
partner and facilitator than as director. States should work to complement 
markets, not replace them." (World Development Report, 1997, p18). 
The idea of complementarity of action is echoed in the investigation of farmer-
controlled enterprise and access to services, by NRI and the Plunkett Foundation: 
"One area where assistance might be justified is in developing and piloting 
new institutional arrangements between companies, banks and smallholders 
which are mutually acceptable in terms of risk-sharing and the distribution of 
benefits". (Stringfellow et al., 1997). 
The research reported here builds on three main areas of work: 
• it is informed by the now considerable literature on rural finance, and the 
development of viable credit programmes (this literature is summarised in 
Goodland et al., 1999) 
• it complements recent research by Wye College on interlocking markets 
(Dorward et al, 1998), and 
• it draws on the NRI/Plunkett Foundation work on farmer controlled-
enterprise (Stringfellow et al., 1997), as well as other work on producer 
groups and access to rural services. 
The specific case studies were identified during the course of earlier research by the 
project leader on agricultural markets in Zimbabwe and Uganda (Gordon, 1997a and 
1997b). However, in a broader sense, the demand for the research is evident in the 
growing concern about farmer access to rural services in post-liberalisation Africa. 
This concern is evident in, for instance: 
(a) DFID's focus on credit in the CPHP, and in other programmes (for 
instance, the Policy Research Programme focus on the delivery of agricultural 
services); 
(b) the results of research funded under those DFID programmes (for instance, 
Poulton et al., 1997, stress the prevalence of credit market failure in small-
holder agriculture, and the need for further work in this area, and Stringfellow 
et al., 1997 similarly focus on the need for more work on " . . . developing and 
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piloting new institutional arrangements between companies, banks and 
smallholders ... "); 
(c) in Uganda, credit is seen as a critical component in the response to the 
President's call for the "modernisation" of agriculture ( 1997) 
Project Purpose 
The purpose of the research was the development and promotion of efficient and 
effective marketing and credit systems. 
The project analysed two unusual private sector farmer credit schemes and identified 
key factors affecting viability. Both schemes demonstrate potential to enforce 
repayment in the absence of crop purchase monopolies. 
The case studies yielded information on critical factors affecting the viability of credit 
schemes and mechanisms to screen borrowers, monitor and enforce repayment. This 
information can be used with data on the characteristics of other small-holder crop 
sectors (structure of primary output, market players, functions, asset profile, access to 
working capital, linkages) to identify sectors where (a) there is a need for credit (b) a 
source of funds for credit, and ( c) conditions which favour the application of the 
lessons from the case studies. 
Research Activities 
The project activities were focused on the achievement of four principal outputs: 
(i) critical analysis of cotton sector farmer credit schemes in Uganda and 
Zimbabwe 
(ii) review of potential applications of these models to other commodity 
sectors 
(iii) stakeholder workshops, and 
(iv) dissemination outputs 
The first activity was the collection of background information on smallholder credit 
programmes and the agricultural sectors in Uganda and Zimbabwe. This was an 
essential part of the planning and preparation of field work. It was carried out in the 
UK, through review of secondary data, correspondence and discussions with key 
individuals in Uganda or Zimbabwe, and contact with others who had recently worked 
there. 
Field work was conducted in Uganda and Zimbabwe during September- November 
1998, by Andrew Goodland and Ann Gordon (both economists at NRI). Field 
assistance was provided in Uganda by Rosetti Nabbumba of the Economic and Policy 
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Research Centre at Makerere University, and in Zimbabwe by Taswell Chivere of the 
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe. Joanne Mhunduru, Crop Post-Harvest Research 
Programme Co-ordinator, also provided invaluable advice on the work programme and 
suggested contacts in Zimbabwe. Many other individuals and organisations contributed 
to research and discussions, and these are listed in the field work reports (Goodland, 
1999a and Goodland, 1999b, submitted together with the present report). 
Detailed studies of the cotton credit schemes were undertaken (output 1 ). In Uganda, 
the scheme involves the distribution of "free" seed and chemicals to farmers, financed 
by a loan taken out.jointly by the ginners. The costs are recouped from farmers by a 
uniform reduction in the price ginners pay for seed cotton, and from ginners on the basis 
of individual volumes ginned. The work in Uganda involved interviews with farmers, 
extension agents, ginners (including representatives of the Uganda Ginners and 
Exporters Association), staff of the Cotton Development Organisation and the 
Agricultural Policy Secretariat, donors, NGOs, farm input suppliers, banks, and others 
working in agricultural or rural development, as well as review of relevant data on 
cotton production and ginning. 
In Zimbabwe, two of the three cotton companies run independent farmer credit schemes, 
in which credit advanced as inputs is deducted from the price received for subsequent 
sales of seed cotton. The work in Zimbabwe involved interviews with a similar group 
of stakeholders, but included in addition the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (which is much 
more active than its approximate counterpart in Uganda, the Uganda National Farmers 
Association), and the third cotton company, which deliberately declines to operate a 
smallholder credit programme. 
In both countries information was also collected on the experience with smallholder 
credit in other sectors. In addition, potential application of the cotton models to other 
sub-sectors was explored, drawing on preliminary analyses of the factors governing the 
performance of the cotton programmes (output 2), and interviews with commercial 
sector stakeholders involved in the purchase of other smallholder crops. 
The field studies in both countries yielded new information on smallholder credit (novel 
approaches to smallholder credit are being developed in both countries). However, the 
field work pointed up much wider interest in interventions that improve smallholder 
access to purchased inputs (both alternatives and complements to credit). In response to 
this, it was decided that the stakeholder workshops (output 3) should not only focus on 
credit mechanisms - but should also cover other issues affecting smallholder access to 
inputs. 
Stakeholder workshops were conducted in February and March 1999. Each workshop 
included invited contributions on various aspects of smallholder access to farm inputs, 
working groups, and a plenary session at which group findings were presented and 
conclusions developed. Participants included: cotton sector representatives; companies 
involved in the purchase of other smallholder crops; input supply companies; farmer 
organisation representatives; extension agents; NGOs and projects involved in 
smallholder credit and input programmes; donors; researchers; and agricultural sector 
policy-makers. The workshop proceedings (Gordon and Goodland, eds., 1999a and 
l 999b) are submitted along with the present report. 
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Activities in support of dissemination commenced once the initial field work was 
complete. These activities included: the production and distribution of formal 
dissemination outputs; stakeholder participation in workshop planning, presentations; 
debate and proceedings; informal discussions and planning of potential follow-up to the 
research. (The latter was not funded by the project, but is noted here because of its 
importance in the dissemination process). Full details of dissemination outputs are 
provided in the next section. 
Planned inputs were achieved. The finalisation of the workshop proceedings was 
brought forward, however, because of intense interest in the topic. The workshops had 
attracted enthusiastic participation, and made a timely contribution to current debate in 
both countries, where for different reasons smallholder access to inputs is a key 
commercial and policy priority. In view of this, permission was obtained to vire some 
funds from in-country costs (the direct costs of the workshop and local consultancies 
were less than anticipated) into staff costs, and extend the reporting period by two 
months, to produce additional dissemination outputs. 
Outputs 
Analysis of the cotton sector credit programmes in Uganda and Zimbabwe 
The first output from the project was a critical review of the cotton sector credit 
programmes in Uganda and Zimbabwe. Box 1 summarises the characteristics of the 
cotton sectors in each country (essential background to an understanding of how the 
credit programmes have developed). The motive for the credit programmes is similar in 
both countries: a desire to increase small-holder production, in order to achieve higher 
levels of ginning plant utilisation. In Zimbabwe, the large-scale commercial farmers are 
now supplying less cotton as they shift into more lucrative commodity sectors (such as 
high value horticulture). In Uganda, there has been large-scale recent and relatively 
sudden private investment in the ginneries, following liberalisation of the sector. Cotton 
grown in tropical zones is particularly prone to pests, and in both countries, an input 
credit programme (covering expensive chemicals particularly) is regarded by many as an 
essential ingredient in promoting cotton production by smallholders1• In Uganda, low 
yields and bitter memories of low state-controlled prices and an unreliable voucher 
payment system, have resulted in a slow farmer response to the new marketing 
arrangements, underlining the urgent need for the new ginners to demonstrate their 
commitment to the crop, and help farmers overcome cash constraints in acquiring the 
necessary inputs. 
In Zimbabwe, the former parastatal operated a relatively successful input credit 
programme. A comprehensive database, and a monopoly on purchases of seed cotton, 
made it easy to deduct the costs of inputs advanced, when farmers sold their crop. 
Following liberalisation, however, farmers were able to sell their crop to any of three 
cotton companies, and loan repayment rates fell dramatically from 98% (1992/93) to 
79% (1994/95). Procedures were subsequently tightened (see Box 3 for a description of 
the best practice measures adopted, and Annex 2 for more detail), such that repayment 
1 For completeness, Uganda's organic zone should be mentioned. Parts of Uganda produce certified 
organic cotton. Chemicals are not necessary here because of the presence of a beneficial black ant. 
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rates are now I 00% (and 98% in the smaller but similarly-run scheme operated by one 
of the other companies). Interesting points about the Zimbabwean schemes are: 
• their scale - they reach far more rural households than any other formal 
source of rural finance (a total ofroughly 60,000 farmers in 1998/99) 
• the institutions (legal, political and cultural) which reinforce financial 
discipline and enable the companies to seize assets promptly in the event of 
default 
• their explicit commercial focus on the more able smallholders (who reliably 
repay and who normally achieve a certain minimum cotton yield) 
• the package of measures used to facilitate and coerce repayment, involving 
the farmer, his/her peers, and village-based and company monitors 
• extreme confidence in repayment, such that some farmers are able to take out 
cash (not in-kind) loans 
• transport and bulk purchase arrangements with input companies which help 
reduce costs 
• innovative plans to graduate the best performers onto bank loans; thereby 
extending coverage at even less cost to the cotton company, and 
• a strict commercial focus on ''value for money" - sticking with productive 
reliable fanners for whom the transaction costs are low and the returns high, 
and resisting the temptation to expand the scheme to cover a less reliable 
cadre of less productive farmers 
• development of these schemes without co-operation (information sharing) 
between the companies (which although ostensibly easy for just three 
companies, may not have occurred because the former parastatal, whose 
operations dwarf those of the other two, probably has more to lose than to 
gain from co-operation of this nature). 
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Box 1: How the cotton sectors of Uganda and Zimbabwe compare 
Similarities 
• both have been producing cotton since the early part of this century 
• both sectors were liberalised in 1994 - resulting in competitive crop 
purchase markets 
• ginning capacity exceeds seed cotton production in both countries 
• market and state reforms have led to changes in the availability of inputs 
for smallholders 
• both sectors have received considerable donor/government support in the 
90s 
• the small-holder crop in both countries is unirrigated 
Differences 
• cotton production in Uganda is 100% smallholder; in Zimbabwe the large-
scale commercial farmers produce roughly 1/3 of output 
• cotton production in Zimbabwe is much higher than in Uganda (the 
1997/98 Zimbabwean harvest was about 275,000 tonnes of seed cotton, 
compared with roughly 45,000 tonnes in Uganda in 1998/99) 
• the agricultural sector is more developed in Zimbabwe with better 
infrastructure, a well-developed agro-processing sector, and more use of 
purchased inputs - but some of these services are geared to the large-scale 
commercial sector 
• Uganda has a large nwnber of cotton ginners (around 30), thougll a few 
large companies (5?) account for 50-60% of the cotton ginned; Zimbabwe 
has only three ginning companies, and one (the Cotton Company of 
Zimbabwe) dwarfs the other two 
• In Zimbabwe small-holder cotton production has been increasing since the 
early 80s, whereas recovery in Uganda is more shaky and more recent 
• Zimbabwe is a significantly higher income country than Uganda and 
commercial services are more developed in almost all sectors. 
The Uganda scheme is quite different. By comparison with the Zimbabwe schemes it 
appears clwnsy and inefficient. Yet it is also a pragmatic, stop-gap mechanism, which 
although suffering from several problems currently, has the potential (and inherent 
pressure) for improvement. The back-drop to the scheme was a poor farmer response to 
the recently liberalised sector, an urgent need to boost production, and disastrous 
repayment rates on the individual input credit scpemes run by some of ginneries (due to 
farmers avoiding repayment by selling to one of the other nwnerous cotton companies). 
The ginners formed an association, with compulsory membership by all companies, and 
jointly took out a loan to cover the costs of a minimal package of farm inputs (seed and 
sufficient pesticide for two sprays). Inputs are distributed to farmers, and the costs 
recouped in the first instance through a cess on the price farmers receive for their seed 
cotton, but with responsibility for repayment resting firmly with the ginners on the basis 
ofvolwnes ginned by individual companies (verified by independent contracted 
monitors, and export licence applications). Annex 2 provides more detail. Nonetheless, 
there are a nwnber of problems with the scheme: 
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• difficulties assuring the timeliness of input delivery 
• diversion of inputs by intermediaries responsible for their distribution, or 
attempts to charge farmers for the inputs at the point of delivery 
• inputs given out to non-cotton farmers and cotton farmers going without 
• farmers using the inputs on other crops, or selling them 
• too few spray pumps with which to apply the chemicals 
• farmers deprived of the opportunity to make an informed decision based on 
the cost and benefits of pesticide application 
• all cotton farmers selling seed cotton to Ugandan ginners2, bar registered 
organic producers selling to specific ginners, pay equally for the cost of the 
scheme since it affects the price ginners can afford to pay for seed cotton3 
• critics claim that the scheme is vulnerable to rent-seeking at all levels 
Yet, it is also interesting and innovative in a number of ways, and points a way forward 
in situations where less (institutionally) complicated approaches to credit may not work. 
Interesting features of the Ugandan model include: 
• its scale (reaching around 300,000 farmers) and poverty focus (cotton is now 
a low-risk, marginally profitable crop, unattractive to better resourced 
farmers, and grown partly because of benefits to following crops, and the 
timing of crop sales which coincide with Christmas and new school year 
expenditures) 
• the potential it offers for input credit in situations where interlocking (of 
credit and crop sales) would not work (because of the market characteristics, 
and because of weak legal and political institutions for enforcing repayment), 
without removing the potential for competition between ginners (who use 
price to compete with one another for the farmer's crop) 
• the key role played by the public regulatory board (the Cotton Development 
Organisation), using public and donor funds, to facilitate the establishment 
of the ginners association and its access to concessionary finance (in the first 
year only), advising on and co-ordinating the distribution of farm inputs, and 
helping establish mechanisms to monitor ginning volumes to ensure fair 
contributions to repayment of the input loan 
• its precarious dependence (at least at the outset) on manipulating information 
- so, for instance, the first year of the scheme effectively involved a 50% 
subsidy4 because the ginners' contractual obligation was to repay at a certain 
rate per kg of seed cotton ginned (a higher rate would probably have been 
unacceptable to ginners and farmers alike), but the rate was based on a 
2 Unknown quantities of seed cotton are illegally exported to Kenya where significantly higher prices 
are paid. This probably affects the neighbouring districts more than other areas. Seed cotton is traded 
by the bag, loaded on bicycles. It is not clear whether there is any significant large-scale organised 
trade in seed cotton. 
3 CDO and UGEA state erroneously that the cost of inputs is met 50:50 by ginners and farmers, and the 
seed cotton guide price is adjusted downwards to reflect the 50% contribution by farmers. However, 
there is intense competition for seed cotton, since all the ginneries are operating well below capacity, 
and all are having to meet the costs of loans taken out for rehabilitation and modernisation. Farmers 
almost always receive more than the guide price and it appears that ginners pay as much as they can 
afford to secure their supplies of seed cotton. 
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excluding the cost of CDO' s own inputs 
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grossly optimistic crop forecast, such that a govenunent guarantee on the 
loan came into effect; footnote 3 provides another example of how 
information was manipulated 
• the conditions under which ginners were willing to co-operate to achieve a 
common goal (there were probably more uniform gains from this, than might 
have arisen in Zimbabwe, but even so the co-operation was not always 
enthusiastic with CDO perhaps able to exert influence, and pressure from the 
larger ginners who also export on behalf of some of the smaller ginners) 
• in-built commercial pressure for improved performance despite evident 
teething problems (the ginners are unlikely to tolerate an operation which on-
goingly misses its target, particularly once the subsidy element is reduced) 
Box 2 compares the performance of the contrasting input credit schemes. 
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Box 2: Summary of credit scheme performance 
Performance criteria Countries 
Repayment 
Farmer participation 
Efficient use of inputs 
Dependence on subsidies 
Effect on seed cotton 
output 
Wider development 
impacts 
Sustainability 
Zimbabwe 
High: 98%+ 
53,000 small-holders 
probably more able 
farmers 
No data available but 
inputs likely to be used 
efficiently because of: 
• monitoring and 
extension 
• farmers pay for 
inputs 
• inputs not 
significantly 
subsidised 
Minor subsidy element 
only? 
Positive - particularly as 
focus seems to be on more 
productive farmers 
Capacity-building with 
farmers and groups, 
empowerment 
Appears sustainable: 
• subsidy is small 
• capacity-
building 
• demonstrated 
ability to repay 
• process permits 
further 
development 
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Uganda 
Effectively only 50% in 1st 
year 
300,000 including many 
self-selecting resource-
poor, risk averse farmers 
Evidence of significant 
"leakage" and inputs not 
necessarily available when 
needed in a form that 
farmers can use (ie too few 
spray pumps). Perverse 
incentives: efficient 
producers effectively pay 
more for their inputs, and 
less efficient more 
Major subsidy in 1st year to 
be reduced in years 2 and 
3. Scheme presently 
relatively high cost - and 
may collapse in the 
absence of subsidy 
Effect not clear - ginners 
nonetheless confident that 
scheme is necessarv 
Wider impacts are limited 
- inherently paternalistic 
scheme, with benefits 
related directly to any 
increased income accruing 
to farmers 
Questionable - unless 
costs can be significantly 
reduced, inputs more 
focused on intended 
beneficiaries, and 
dependence on subsidy 
reduced. 
Ginners nonetheless still 
confident - and likely to 
exert pressure for more 
efficient operation 
Potential application of cotton input schemes to other sectors 
The second project output was the identification of other sectors with scope for 
application of similar input schemes. 
In post-liberalisation Africa, there has been considerable reflection on private sector 
reticence to provide services previously provided by the state. One of the areas that has 
suffered is small-holder access to inputs and credit. However, this research in Uganda 
and Zimbabwe illustrates that there are some very considerable successes - with very 
high farmer participation - that are significantly funded by the private sector (and are 
unarguably a private sector initiative). Although both of these case studies focus on 
cotton, a number of more generic lessons can be drawn. 
In the first instance, it is possible to identify the conditions under which credit is likely 
to be offered. The main reason for offering credit is to address some kind of supply 
constraint: 
• assuring supplies of appropriate quality, volume, regularity and price 
• reducing costs of acquiring raw material 
• keeping markets or plant supplied at levels which assure viability, future 
market access or desired market share 
• protecting long run raw material supply. 
Small-holder credit programmes are risky and administratively onerous, and in the 
absence of any need to improve the supply of raw material (in various ways), traders 
or processors are unlikely to offer farmers production credit. 
Secondly, farmer interest in participating in a credit scheme will be influenced by: 
• perception of benefits derived from use of inputs and market access 
• scheme offers better/cheaper/easier access to inputs and/or credit 
• farmer operates in context where s/he is able to plan ahead and willing/able 
to take some risk 
Unfortunately, where there is a recent history ofloan amnesties and default without 
penalty, farmers may not consider participation in the scheme to confer an obligation 
to make repayments. (The accessibility of the scheme will also influence farmer 
participation, but this is discussed below under viability and modus operandi). 
Thirdly, providing there are incentives for crop purchasers to offer credit, and for 
farmers to take credit, it is possible to identify the factors which influence the viability 
of such input credit schemes. In Box 3 these are divided into: crop market 
characteristics; input characteristics; the overall commercial context; and modus 
operandi of the scheme. 
So-called "killer assumptions" are also identified: where crop purchase monopolies 
persist, it is relatively easy to ensure repayment, but this situation is increasingly rare; 
it is generally less risky to provide inputs in-kind, but this does not provide a water-
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tight guarantee that inputs will be used in the manner intended because their 
opportunity cost may be higher when aoolied to other crops or when resold. 
Box 3: Factors which influence viability of crop input credit schemes 
Factors/aspect Effect 
Crop market characteristics 
1. Crop purchase monopoly and no food/farm use of crop + * 
2. Possible for all buyers/users to form association and no food/farm use + 
3. Multiple marketing channels and/or food use -
Input qualities 
1. Inputs provided in-kind + 
2. Limited alternative use or market for input + * 
3. Returns to input use are greatest for the crop in question + * 
Commercial/credit context 
1. Farmers treat farm as a business and are integrated into markets + 
2. History of loan amnesties, default without penalty, subsidised inputs -
3. Supportive legal/political/contract enforcement institutions + 
Modus operandi of scheme 
1. Group schemes for peer pressure + 
2. Group or individual schemes backed up by monitoring/ good + 
information, support staff, and ability to act 
3. Incentives for repayment and penalties for non-repayment + 
4. Appropriate incentives for field monitors/co-ordinators + 
5. Training provided to farmers - extension and business management + 
6. Developing relationship/trust/loyalty through field presence/contact + 
7. Accessibility of scheme - minimise red tape and transaction costs; + 
organise so location and timing of contact is convenient to farmers 
8. Effective and timely monitoring of input use and crop marketing + 
Note: *denotes killer assumption 
The significance of these categories, and particular aspects, is that they need not all be 
present for a scheme to work, but most schemes will need to incorporate several 
aspects to ensure a degree of success. For instance, the Ugandan example relied on 
the buyers forming an association (crop market characteristic 2), but for the scheme to 
succeed it was also necessary for inputs to be provided in-kind, and to incorporate 
several measures from the modus operandi group ( eg., monitoring, extension and 
accessibility). The scheme can then function, even ifthe overall commercial context is 
weak. 
The research in Zimbabwe indicates that even when few favourable crop market and 
input conditions are present (fertiliser and cash(!) are available on credit in 
Zimbabwe), it is nonetheless possible to develop strong and viable input schemes. 
The success of the schemes in Zimbabwe is very dependent on the presence of 
favourable conditions relating to overall commercial context, and modus operandi. 
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The measures listed in the modus operandi group are essentially best practice in 
lending to small-scale farmers. They are carrot and stick measures -which do not 
depend solely on unrealistic assumptions about, for instance, the ability to enforce 
contracts using legal mechanisms (which even if possible, would probably be very 
transaction costs-intensive). These are the measures used in the Zimbabwe cotton 
credit schemes. Their focus on groups, training and the development of appropriate 
incentive systems makes them initially costly - but once in place, farmers can take on 
a greater share of these costs (groups can act as crop assembly points, distribution 
points for inputs, a vehicle for extension, and a means by which farmer participation 
in wider democratic processes can be encouraged - reducing the transaction costs 
inherent in reaching small-scale farmers). Moreover, these measures build 
group/individual capacity so that farmers are able to combine their knowledge of, for 
instance, land qualities and crop management, with information about inputs, and use 
this to make informed decisions about input use. Without capacity building such as 
this, technology packages tend to be inflexible (and therefore not ideal in all 
situations) or very costly in terms of extension (as seen, for instance, with some of the 
intensively-managed small-holder outgrower export horticulture schemes in Africa). 
Nonetheless, the implicit start-up costs, and the fact that the benefits are long-term 
(and also, far wider than just the crop in question) mean that they are only likely to be 
attractive to companies able to take a longer view. 
Such best practice mechanisms in rural lending are robust to different situations. For 
instance, they are similar to the measures used by Grameen Bank type schemes -
where inputs are not necessarily provided in-kind or targeted to a particular crop. This 
approach, moreover, yields benefits even where the marketing structure does not 
demand such an approach. (In Mali, for instance, the cotton parastatal5, which has a 
crop purchase monopoly, uses virtually all of these measures to reduce transaction 
costs and increase cotton output). There seems to be a clear lesson here for Uganda 
too: whilst it is difficult to envisage a preferable viable alternative to the existing 
scheme given current conditions and circumstances (and this is true, despite all the 
problems in the operation of the input scheme), it does not obviate the necessity and 
desirability of investment in longer term measures aimed at more sustainable and 
substantive improvements in small-holder productivity. At the same time, it may be 
more difficult still to get commitment to such long-term goals amongst a large group 
of companies, many of whom are reluctant participants in the current scheme (see 
below). 
The possibility of creating a buyers' association seems to greatly expand the potential 
for viable commercially-provided small-holder credit. Yet, on closer examination, 
there are probably relatively few situations where this is likely to happen. In Uganda, 
it was administratively costly and time-consuming to organise such an association (the 
CDO played a key role in this, with the support of a small number of larger ginners, 
5 The parastatal is in fact a hybrid, with a 40% share retained by The Compagnie Francaise pour le 
Developpement des Textiles. 
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but the smaller ginners were apparently reluctant partners). The larger ginners had 
most to gain from an increase in cotton output. They were able to exert pressure on 
the smaller ginners via the CDO (membership of the Uganda Ginners and Exporters 
Association is compulsory) and also because the larger ginner-exporters export some 
of the cotton ginned by the smaller companies. Moreover, all the ginners face similar 
problems and constraints - and no single company is privileged in the resources it has 
to tackle these issues. So although there are a few larger companies (which are 
substantially better-resourced/cushioned than the smaller ginners), these larger 
companies are on a fairly equal footing with one another. By contrast in Zimbabwe, a 
buyers' association (of just three cotton companies) would be relatively easy to 
organise - but there is little interest in doing so. The largest company (the former 
parastatal whose operations dwarf those of the other companies) undoubtedly has 
privileged access to information about individual farmers, farm output and repayment 
history. It appears to have judged its competitive advantage best-served by protecting 
this exclusive access to information (and devising alternative measures to combat the 
problems encountered in the wake of crop marketing liberalisation). Another factor 
which limits the potential to replicate the buyers' association approach is that it will 
only solve the problem of "side-selling" (farmers taking credit from one company and 
selling output to another) ifthe crop in question has no value on-farm or i:q. local 
markets. This limits potential considerably - mostly to crops which need to be 
industrially processed (such as fibres and some oilseeds) or which are exclusively 
produced for export (such as tobacco, in some places). 
In summary, the potential to use the buyers' association approach to credit seems to 
depend on: 
• existence of mechanisms to exert pressure on laggards/reluctant partners 
• a fairly level playing field between buyers (ie comparability in what they 
stand to gain/lose), and 
• crop use options limited to those buyers (little food use or local 
marketing). 
A number of complements and alternatives to input credit schemes were also 
identified (see below) which have application across many sectors. 
Stakeholder workshops 
Stakeholder workshops comprised the third project output. The starting point for this 
research was the need to increase smallholder productivity through improved access to 
purchased inputs. Credit was assumed to hold the key to this. However, in Uganda 
and Zimbabwe, although there was widespread interest in access to purchased inputs, 
many people stressed the role of non-credit factors, and some people were outspoken 
in their view that credit was often inappropriate. The stakeholder workshops 
conducted in Zimbabwe and Uganda therefore focused on the broader picture -
looking at credit and other factors that influence access to inputs, as complements to 
credit or as alternatives. Five categories of factors were identified: 
• affordability 
• availability 
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• information 
• risk and uncertainty, and 
• commercial context. 
For example, credit helps make inputs more affordable. However, affordability can 
also be improved by: 
• timing of sales to coincide with times when farmers have cash (seen with 
cotton input sales in Zimbabwe 
• inputs sold in pack sizes suited to small producers ( eg seed) 
• lower prices, achieved by cost reductions in distribution and marketing ( eg 
through bulk purchases, transport sharing arrangements, and farmers' 
groups taking on more responsibilities). 
The physical availability of inputs in rural areas is also an important constraint, with 
thin and unreliable rural distribution networks in most African countries. Innovative 
projects in Uganda and Zimbabwe, seeking to promote the development of input 
stockist networks, were reviewed at the workshops. 
Information constraints were highlighted by many people - be they in terms of 
information gaps (some basic research on fertiliser response for certain crops and soil 
conditions has not been undertaken) or information flows (accessing and 
disseminating this information). Innovative arrangements between farmers' 
organisations, extension agents, NGOs, input companies and output traders were 
reviewed - with particularly interesting examples from Zimbabwe. Improved 
information on input application is clearly needed - and extension makes an important 
contribution to the performance of input credit programmes. 
The role of risk and uncertainty, and the overall commercial environment within 
which farmers operate, were also reviewed. 
The wider lessons on input access are explored in a further output of the project (a 
publication in NRI's policy series, attached here at Annex 3). 
The workshops made an extremely timely contribution to debate in both countries. 
There was considerable interest in the workshops and potential follow-up. In Uganda, 
the specific context for this is the Programme for the Modernisation of Agriculture. 
This is a current consultative process aimed at the development of appropriate policy 
and intervention to develop smallholder agriculture along more commercial and 
productive lines. It is accorded a high priority at all levels, with the term first coined 
in a speech by Museveni in 1997. In Zimbabwe, there is growing commercial and 
public sector focus on the communal farming sector. 
Workshop proceedings (Gordon and Goodland, eds, 1999a and 1999b) are submitted 
together with this present report. 
Dissemination outputs 
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The fourth output from the project was the preparation and distribution of 
dissemination outputs. 
Formal dissemination outputs are listed in Box 4. Outputs I, 2, 3, 4 and 6 were 
originally proposed, and outputs 5, 7, 8 and 9 are additional. 
Dissemination of project outputs was also achieved by other mechanisms, notably 
relating to follow-up proposals. These are discussed in the following s~tion. 
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Box4: List and status of formal dissemination outputs 
Ou tout Status 
1. Discussion papers on cotton credit Presented at workshops and included in 
programmes and other potential workshop proceedings. 
aoolications 
2. Workshop proceedings Distributed to workshop participants and 
wider audience in March 1999. Copies of 
proceedings submitted together with 
present report. 
3. Journal article on credit schemes Currently under review with Savings and 
Development, with draft attached at Annex 
2 
4. Publication in NRI's policy series on In press, with text attached at Annex 3. 
smallholder access to purchased inputs 
5. A Development Issues paper (a shorter In press, with text attached at Annex 4. 
format series published by NRI and 
available on the web) 
6. Shorter articles intended for a wider Submitted, with example attached at 
audience, for publication in ( eg), Spore Annex 5. 
and the bulletin of the Zimbabwe Farmers' 
Union. 
7. Paper presented at workshop on Presented July 1999, and attached at 
Agricultural Marketing Reform in Annex6. 
southern Africa, organised by OPM and 
funded by DFID. 
8. Paper to be presented at seminar on In preparation, for presentation 27 
New Development Finance, Goethe September- I October 1999. 
University of Frankfurt, organised by 
University of Frankfurt and The Ohio 
State University. Sponsored by USAID; 
DFID; Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau 
(KfW); and 3 consulting companies. 
9. Journal article comparing experience In preparation, pending further data 
with cotton input networks in Uganda with collection in India by NRI co-author 
situation in India (drawing on CPP-funded 
research still in process) 
Contribution of Outputs 
The goal of the DFID's Crop Post-Harvest Programme of the RNRKS is: "livelihoods 
of poor people improved through sustainably enhanced production and productivity of 
RNR systems". Its purpose is: "poor people benefit from new knowledge applied to 
food commodity systems". (When this project was approved the programme purpose 
gave less explicit emphasis to poverty reduction: "productivity and productive potential 
of selected production systems improved through reduction of post harvest losses and 
development of processing and marketing innovations"). 
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This project sought to contribute to those aims through the development and promotion 
of efficient and effective marketing and credit systems, focusing particularly on the use 
of credit to improve access by resource-poor farmers to productivity-enhancing 
purchased farm inputs. Two credit schemes were studied in detail, both still in a state of 
evolution and development, that have coverage far in excess of any other formal sources 
of credit available to smallholders. Moreover, they are particularly interesting because 
both are private sector initiatives, and the Uganda example has especially strong poverty 
focus. 
The project memor~dum anticipated three principal mechanisms for dissemination and 
uptake of project results: 
(1) via the involvement of key stakeholders in the research and workshops 
(2) via publication of the research results, and 
(3) via uptake in the form of further work and projects. 
In Uganda, the work has contributed to the longer-term consultative process concerned 
with the Programme for the Modernisation of Agriculture. Three people playing a key 
role in this process participated in the workshop. Two contributed papers, and the third 
helped with the planning of the workshop, and chaired one of the sessions. The 
workshop was also attended by other stakeholders who contributed to the debate. 
At a more concrete-level, however, the research has contributed to, or led to the 
development of, several other initiatives in Uganda, for instance: 
• DFID's private sector development adviser and the RNR adviser, in Uganda, 
asked the project leader to prepare two concept notes dealing with (a) seed 
supply and (b) fertiliser markets; this was a direct result of issues raised by 
the research; the concept notes were well-received and follow-up is 
anticipated, once new advisers are in post (both original advisers have now 
left Uganda); 
• the cotton studies have been discussed with stakeholders in the sector (both 
private and public), and there is interest at Serere Agricultural and Animal 
Production Research Institute (which has the remit for cotton research), and 
the Cotton Development Organisation, in exploring longer-term farmer 
group-based approaches to extension and input supply; this was raised by the 
Ugandan collaborators in the context of other cotton sector work carried out 
by the project leader in June 1999; possible funding sources include DFID 
bilateral, DFID RNRKS, CFC, World Bank (in relation to current interest in 
extension models); 
• the focus on smallholder access to inputs coincided with initiatives by 
USAID and F AO, who funded missions on fertiliser markets and soil fertility 
respectively, in late 1998; the results of all three studies have been shared, 
and discussions have been held with F AO on ways in which the NRI work 
can contribute to Uganda's Soil Fertility Initiative (FAO, 1999). 
In Zimbabwe, agricultural input companies that attended the workshop, were interested 
in ways to extend their work with communal sector farmers. The DFID bilateral 
programme was also interested in this area, and the project leader was asked to prepare a 
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concept note on improving communal fanner access to soil fertility enhancing inputs in 
Natural Regions IV and V. This was well-received and a decision on further work is 
awaited pending revisions to the country NR strategy (expected September 1999). 
The project outputs have also found a wider audience via distribution outside Uganda 
and Tanzania, and presentation at other workshops (for instance at Oxford Policy 
Management in July 1999, and the planned presentation at Frankfurt in September 
1999). Unsolicited requests for talks (the OPM talk for instance) and copies of 
dissemination outputs (for example, from F AO, and TWIN Trading6), is evidence of 
genuine interest in the work and the effectiveness of prior dissemination activities. 
Moreover, the research is already being cited in other work (Poulton et al., 1999). 
Further development of the work is anticipated through further dissemination of 
research outputs, continuation of the project processes already initiated and described 
above, and incorporation of the findings into other new work in which NRI and other 
development organisations are involved (for instance, the work will be used in a 
forthcoming "best practice guide" on rural credit). 
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Production credit for African small-holders: conditions for private provision1 
By Ann Gordon and Andrew Goodland, Natural Resources Institute, UK2. 
Abstract 
It was hoped that market reforms in sub-Saharan Africa would unleash the private 
sector, such that farmers would benefit from access to new markets and dynamic 
privately provided services. The reality is that commercial activity has been highly 
selective and often disappointing. Many farmers face a deterioration in market 
access and services, including credit. This paper examines the conditions for private 
sector provision of production credit for smallholders. Drawing on recent field work 
in Uganda and Zimbabwe, it analyses the performance of two contrasting approaches 
to smallholder credit. These schemes have coverage far in excess of any other formal 
sector source of credit for smallholders (300, 000 and 53, 000 farmers respectively). 
The Zimbabwean scheme is an apparently commercially sustainable text book model 
of how to run such a scheme. The Ugandan scheme is paternalistic, institutionally 
complicated and subject to significant inefficiencies in its operation, but nonetheless a 
potentially significant improvement on the "without scheme" scenario. Of note also is 
the scale of coverage, and its strong poverty focus. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of generic lessons for other credit schemes and commodities. 
1 This publication is an output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed here 
are not necessarily those ofDFID. R7197, Crop Post-Harvest Research Programme. 
2 The authors are grateful to Alan Marter and Colin Poulton for comments received on an earlier draft. 
1. Introduction 
Historically, increases in agricultural output in sub-Saharan Africa were largely 
attributable to the expansion of cultivated area - through destruction of forest and 
cultivation of increasingly marginal areas. However, the scope to convert new lands 
has declined and it is now widely accepted that further production increases can only 
come (with a few exceptions) from more intensive production (see for example, 
Badiane and Delgado, 1995, Marter and Gordon, 1996, Lipton, 1988). 
Whilst some intensification is achievable using farmers' own inputs, there is also an 
important role for purchased inputs - particularly improved seed and inorganic 
fertiliser. Prior to the economic reforms that have swept through most of Africa in the 
last 10-15 years, many farmers had better access to purchased inputs than they do now 
(though this is not to imply that this situation was sustainable or problem-free). For 
instance: 
• over-valued exchange rates made imported inputs seem less expensive 
• commodity marketing boards often operated crop purchase monopolies 
which made it relatively easy to collect on input loans advanced to farmers 
• credit and inputs were often subject to public sector subsidies, and 
• governments often provided agricultural marketing, extension and input 
services. 
The adjustment vision was that an appropriate enabling environment, with less state 
intervention and economic distortion, would unleash the commercial sector - such 
that farmers would benefit from access to new markets and privately provided 
services. Yet the reality is that commercial activity has been highly selective and 
often disappointing. Those farmers most in need of productivity increases are those 
least able to pay for inputs. Devaluation, a more limited sphere of state activity, and 
tighter controls on loan programmes, have reduced access to inputs. 
"The nature of the challenge is not so much one of prices, although relative 
price changes have undoubtedly exacerbated the difficulties in recent years. 
Rather, it is that the majority of smallholders cannot afford to purchase 
adequate quantities of seasonal inputs on a cash basis at the start of the 
production season" (Poulton et al., 1998, p42). 
In this post-liberalisation era, there is considerable interest in the conditions for 
increased private sector provision of agricultural services - including credit. This 
paper draws on research conducted in Uganda and Zimbabwe in 1998/1999, where 
production inputs are advanced to small-holders by private cotton companies which 
do not operate crop purchase monopolies. The remainder of the paper provides: a 
description of the input credit schemes in each country; comparative analysis of 
performance; and a discussion of lessons for other credit schemes and commodities. 
2. Production input credit schemes for cotton farmers in Uganda and Zimbabwe 
Box 1 summarises the similarities and differences between the cotton sectors of 
Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
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Box 1: How the cotton sectors of U2anda and Zimbabwe compare 
Similarities 
• both have been producing cotton since the early part of this century 
• both sectors were liberalised in 1994 - resulting in competitive crop 
purchase markets 
• ginning capacity exceeds seed cotton production in both countries 
• market and state reforms have led to changes in the availability of inputs 
for smallholders 
• both sectors have received considerable donor/government support in the 
90s 
• the small-holder crop in both countries is unirrigated 
Differences 
• cotton production in Uganda is 100% smallholder; in Zimbabwe the large-
scale commercial farmers produce roughly 1/3 of output 
• the agricultural sector is more developed in Zimbabwe with better 
infrastructure, a well-developed agro-processing sector, and more use of 
purchased inputs - but some of these services are geared to the large-scale 
commercial sector 
• Uganda has a large number of cotton ginners (around 30), though a few 
large companies (5?) account for 50-60% of the cotton ginned; Zimbabwe 
has only three ginning companies, and one (the Cotton Company of 
Zimbabwe) dwarfs the other two 
• In Zimbabwe small-holder cotton production has been increasing since the 
early 80s, whereas recovery in Uganda is more shaky and more recent 
• Zimbabwe is a significantly higher income country than Uganda and 
commercial services are more developed in almost all sectors. 
The incentives to operate input credit schemes are similar in both countries: all 
ginning companies are dependent to some extent on seed cotton from smallholders to 
maintain ginnery utilisation rates; excess capacity in the ginning sector gives 
companies an added reason to seek ways to secure access to smallholder seed cotton; 
and, the general paucity of production services for smallholders threatens seed cotton 
production. 
However, the input credit schemes have evolved differently, so that for the 1998/1999 
season the schemes in the two countries used significantly contrasting approaches. 
The perennial problem in operating such schemes, in the absence of crop purchase 
monopolies, is default by farmers who deliberately "side-sell" their crop to an 
alternative buyer to escape repayment of input loans. 
Uganda 
The withdrawal of the state from free distribution of cottonseed for planting was 
recognised by ginners as seriously jeopardising seed cotton production, and therefore 
threatening the ginning sector. The initial response by one of the larger ginneries was 
to launch an ill-fated input credit scheme (for seed and pesticides). The scheme 
proved disastrous as the majority of smallholders defaulted on their loans, due to a 
combination of side-selling and a poor harvest (it was the El Nino year). Farmers 
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disregarded the agreements they had entered into with the cotton company and sold to 
other ginners offering higher prices. The cotton company making the loans found it 
impossible to enforce the purchase agreements, and attempts to seize assets proved 
unworkable. 
In order to remove the possibility of side-selling, the Uganda Ginners and Exporters 
Association (UGEA) was formed, with compulsory membership of all cotton ginners. 
For the 1998/1999 season the UGEA financed the input credit scheme from a Bank of 
Uganda loan. In developing and operating the input credit scheme, a critical role has 
been played by the Cotton Development Organisation (CDO), a parastatal formed 
when the sector was liberalised, to provide co-ordination and regulatory services. The 
CDO has co-ordinated the distribution of cottonseed and pesticides. Smallholders are 
free to sell their seed cotton to any ginner. The ginners are responsible for loan 
repayment, and these costs are met through a levy payable against volumes of cotton 
ginned by each ginner. (Volumes are assessed by independent monitors assigned to 
each ginnery). Average (not individual) input costs are factored into the seed cotton 
price paid to farmers (and farmers receive the same price irrespective of the quantity 
of inputs supplied to the individual farmer3). The problem of side-selling has 
therefore been overcome by removing the option of selling to alternative buyers: all 
ginners are members of the UGEA so it is impossible for a farmer taking credit to sell 
to buyers outside of the scheme4• Levy avoidance by individual ginners has been 
reduced by the presence of monitors, and dialogue with border officials and spinning 
factories, where ginners (or farmers) may try to make illegal sales. 
Zimbabwe 
Unlike Uganda, there has been little co-operation between the three ginning 
companies in Zimbabwe. Out of the three companies, two operate input credit 
schemes (the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco ), and Cotpro ). Both companies 
use a similar approach to overcome the problem of side-selling: 
• All borrowers belong to groups of cotton smallholders. Default by one member of 
the group brings retribution to the whole group, which may be subsequently 
excluded from the scheme. This increases incentives to repay. It also encourages 
group members to monitor and help one another to ensure that there is no default. 
• Groups performing well receive cash rewards. 
• If defaulting occurs, the companies act swiftly and come down heavily on 
defaulters, seizing assets when necessary. 
• Local agents of the cotton companies are in year-round contact with smallholders, 
building closer relationships and a sense of loyalty to the company5• 
• Additional services are provided in addition to the input credit. Extension advice 
is provided, and the Cotton Company has recently introduced cash loans. Again, 
3 The only exception to this arises in the context of farmers in the organic production area selling 
organic cotton to the certified organic ginner. 
4 Unknown quantities of seed cotton are exported to Kenya where significantly higher prices are paid. 
This probably affects the border districts more than other areas. Seed cotton is traded by the bag, 
loaded on bicycles. It is not clear whether there is any significant large-scale organised trade in seed 
cotton. 
5 Interestingly, this seems to work in the interests of the cotton companies in Zimbabwe. In Ghana, 
however, in the absence of cotton output-based incentives, cotton company field assistants and contact 
farmers ("chief farmers") were liable to register poorly performing farmers and shirk on monitoring 
duties (Poulton, 1998). 
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these additional benefits of "belonging" to a company help to strengthen 
relationships and loyalty. 
3. Cotton input credit schemes: comparing performance in Uganda and 
Zimbabwe 
Seven aspects of performance are considered: 
• Repayment 
• Farmer participation 
• Efficient use of inputs 
• Dependence on subsidies 
• Effect on seed cotton output 
• Wider development impacts, and 
• Sustainability 
Box 3, at the end of the section, summarises the discussion which follows. 
Repayment 
The input credit schemes operating in Zimbabwe reported very high levels of 
repayment by farmers in 1997/98: 98% for the larger of the two schemes, and 100% 
for the other scheme. The larger of these two schemes had suffered low repayment 
rates (79%) in the season immediately following cotton sector liberalisation 
(1994/95), prior to which the company had a monopoly on purchases of seed cotton. 
As a result, however, a number of steps were taken to reduce the risk of default 
(discussed in the previous section). 
The input scheme in Uganda places the burden of repayment on the ginners, with the 
ability to repay dependent on the size of the farmers' harvest. Thus UGEA negotiated 
a loan whereby repayment was promised at a given rate for each kilogram of seed 
cotton ginned, with a government guarantee provided to cover any difference between 
this and the aggregate amount borrowed. Given this formula, and the ginners' need to 
acquire export licenses from CDO (and hence to declare volumes processed6), it is 
relatively straightforward to achieve reported repayment rates of 100%. However, the 
actual harvest in 1998/99 was around 80,000 bales of lint (compared with the forecast 
of 150,000 bales used in calculating loan repayments). The government guarantee 
was therefore necessary to cover roughly 50% of the repayment cost. 
Farmer participation 
The size of these programmes is impressive - and dwarfs any other rural credit 
scheme available in both countries. In Zimbabwe, 53,000 small-holders participated 
in the two schemes in 1997/98 (the larger of the two schemes had 48,000 
participants), representing roughly 25% of small-holder cotton farmers 7. In order to 
participate in the scheme farmers must meet three criteria: good repayment records 
for past years; acceptance by other members of the group; and achievement of certain 
6 The ginners also employed a private company to place monitors in all ginneries as a double-check on 
volumes processed. 
7 Such farmers can be characterised as generally farming small plots of communal or resettled lands, 
that are not irrigated and are principally in Natural Regions III and IV. 
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minimum yield levels. Participation peaked in 1995/96 with 85,500 farmers in the 
largest scheme, but it was subsequently reigned in and procedures tightened. To the 
extent that these are the more able farmers, who are less poor and less vulnerable, it 
focuses on a large minority of more advantaged small-holders. (This focus becomes 
still more pronounced for a small sub-set of participants - 6,000 "gold class" farmers 
who are allowed to borrow cash rather than inputs in-kind). 
To put the programme in more perspective, it is useful to consider the loan portfolio 
of the Agricultural Finance Corporation in Zimbabwe. In its peak lending year 
(1986), it made 94,000 loans. Since then the number of loans has fallen consistently. 
50,000 loans were made in 1990, and less than 4,000 by 1998. However, the AFC has 
had bad experience with repayment rates. High default rates coupled with constraints 
on public spending that meant that government guarantees were not forthcoming, has 
limited the current portfolio to a small number of recipients who are not in arrears on 
earlier loans. 
In Uganda the cotton input scheme in 1998/99 sought to target an incredible 300-
400,000 farmers. Admittedly, it is unlikely that this number was reached, but even if 
the programme was only 70% successful (a figure suggested by CDO's managing 
director), the inputs still reach a very large number of farmers. There has not yet been 
any systematic analysis of the impact of the scheme and who benefits- but given that 
large numbers of farmers are involved it seems plausible that they include a cross-
section of cotton farmers, including many ''typical" resource-poor Ugandan small-
holders. 
Poverty focus appears stronger in Uganda8• In Zimbabwe the credit schemes almost 
certainly focus on the more able farmers, whereas in Uganda, any farmer growing 
cotton is (to some extent) self-selected risk-averse, resource-poor. (Cotton is clearly a 
marginal crop in Uganda, at current prices and yields, and farmers with other options, 
able to take additional risk, are less likely to grow cotton). Moreover, in Uganda 
cotton is grown in the drier more marginal areas. In Zimbabwe, land of comparable 
quality would represent some of the better land farmed by communal farmers; many 
communal farmers live in Natural Region V which cannot support cotton. 
Efficient use of inputs 
In an ideal situation cotton farmers would be able to make a rational decision on the 
use of inputs if: 
• they face real and known prices for inputs and outputs 
• they have reliable information on the relationship between input use and seed 
cotton yields (/quality) 
• they are able to purchase inputs relatively easily, when they wish to, and 
• they are able to sell their seed cotton relatively easily. 
Small-holder farmers in Africa rarely operate under these conditions. Output prices 
usually depend on market conditions and are not known in time to influence 
production decisions (although guide prices may be announced for some crops). 
8 It is important to consider this aspect, particularly where government or donor subsidy is involved -
even if it is not an explicit objective of the commercial cotton companies. 
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Input prices may be more predictable, but rural retailers operating in thin markets 
served by poor infrastructure are often accused of profiteering, and indeed may face 
very variable costs themselves, such that input prices can vary substantially between 
traders, and over the same season. Farmers may have a reasonable understanding of 
the relationship between input use and yields, but there is always a degree of 
uncertainty reflecting the weather or other farmer or location-specific factors (such as 
unforeseen labour constraints arising from illness or heavy demands in another area)9. 
Moreover, specific inputs may not be available, with retailers offering a like product, 
with a different (and perhaps unknown) effect on output. In many parts of rural 
Africa it is not easy for farmers to make timely purchases of inputs: retailers may be 
located some distance away and a farmer may have to visit several outlets (at a cost in 
time and money) before s/he can make the desired purchase; s/he may not be able to 
afford to pay cash, requiring negotiation of credit through formal or informal 
channels; input needs may arise at short notice when they are not available; and so on. 
The last condition, that farmers are able to sell their seed cotton relatively easily, does 
seem to apply, at least in Zimbabwe and Uganda at the present time, where competing 
ginners are anxious to secure access to the crop. Farmers in remoter areas may not 
face so many choices, and may for instance face transport constraints, but at least 
these are generally known aspects, which the farmer can factor into her/his production 
decisions at the start of the growing season. 
Clearly, then, these conditions for efficient use of inputs are unlikely to apply in 
totality. However, information from extension agents, information on prices, and 
improved infrastructure of the sort that helps reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, 
will help farmers approach these conditions. Even then though, given the residual 
uncertainty, farmers would be expected to discount expected returns, and hence apply 
inputs at less than theoretically optimal levels. 
It is interesting to use this framework to consider the conditions faced by small-holder 
cotton farmers in Zimbabwe and Uganda. 
Zimbabwean farmers seem to face better conditions on most counts: 
• inputs are available in rural areas from the cotton companies, and also through the 
network of commercial retailers (which is thin but nonetheless gives better 
coverage than in Uganda); 
• however, input prices are currently subject to some extreme price variability and 
uncertainty caused by depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar, high inflation, and 
rumours of revaluation; 
• cotton companies offer credit, or sell next season inputs when farmers are paid for 
their cotton, and make farmgate deliveries; 
• input supply transaction costs are reduced by higher volumes and innovative 
schemes by cotton companies that link input and output marketing and 
transportation; 
9 Pesticides usually represent a high proportion of cash costs in cotton production. However, there is 
an important "treadmill" effect here, which complicates the relationship between input use and yields. 
With on-going, and increasing use of pesticides, resistance sets in - reducing the yield effect and 
necessitating alternative measures. 
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• rural finance, whilst still a constraint in Zimbabwe, is nonetheless more accessible 
than in Uganda- and one of the cotton companies even lends cash (rather than 
inputs) to small-holders with a good track record of repayment; 
• seed cotton prices are not known in advance with certainty - though guide prices 
are announced; (small-holders are no longer offered forward contracts by the 
cotton companies because of high rates of default when spot market prices at 
harvest time were higher); exchange rate changes create considerable uncertainty 
at the present time; 
• cotton extension systems are reasonably well-developed in Zimbabwe, and many 
(most?) cotton farmers belong to groups linked to the extension efforts of the 
government extension service, NGOs, the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union, the cotton 
companies and input supply companies; these arrangements seem to reduce the 
potential for input companies to offer partial advice; moreover, farmers have more 
recent first hand experience of cotton production than they do in Uganda, where 
production is only just increasing again after a 15-20 year decline. 
Given these circumstances, it is understandable that cotton farmers in Zimbabwe 
make considerably higher use of pesticides and fertiliser than their counterparts in 
Uganda, and achieve higher yields. Crop management is also better. They typically 
spray five times, compared with two in Uganda, and achieve yields of 750 kg/ha (seed 
cotton), compared with around 500kg/ha in Uganda10• 
In rural Uganda, asides from the cotton input scheme, production inputs are not easily 
available to small-holders. Input retailers in rural areas are virtually non-existent11 . 
Farmers do not have access to reliable information about inputs, and have less recent 
experience of cotton production on which to draw. The extension service is stretched 
and currently being restructured. Input prices are neither known by farmers nor 
predictable, and there are no formal sources of credit for small-holders 'Nishing to 
purchase agricultural production inputs12. Farmers are able to sell their cotton 
relatively easily, but this situation has only recently improved - with an 
understandably lagged effect on farmer confidence and production. 
The cotton input scheme being operated in Uganda clearly has its problems: 
• difficulties assuring the timeliness of input delivery 
• diversion of inputs by intermediaries responsible for their distribution, or 
attempts to charge farmers for the inputs at the point of delivery 
• inputs given out to non-cotton farmers and cotton farmers going without 
• farmers using the inputs on other crops, or selling them 
• too few spray pumps with which to apply the chemicals 
• farmers do not have the opportunity to make an informed decision based 
on the cost and benefits of pesticide application 
10 To the authors' knowledge there has been no systematic study of farmer cotton yields in Uganda, 
and acreage is not known with any certainty. Whilst this figure is usually quoted in Uganda, 
consideration of gross output alongside planting seed distributed, would suggest that yields are even 
lower. 
11 A number of donor-supported initiatives are currently trying to rectify this with "gtockist" supply and 
training programmes. 
12 One bank is operating a pilot programme to develop farmer lending methodologies, but its present 
coverage is extremely limited. 
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• getting ginners and government to agree to the scheme seemed to depend 
on assurances that costs to farmers and ginners would be contained; as a 
consequence, an unrealistic harvest forecast was used (which virtually 
assured a government subsidy in the form of the loan guarantee) and 
farmers were misinformed as to who would bear the cost of the inputs13 
• more efficient producers effectively pay more their inputs (because they 
sell more cotton, and a uniform deduction per kg of seed cotton sold is 
made for the cost of the input scheme) whilst less efficient producers face 
lower cost inputs. 
The scheme is inherently paternalistic in its approach - with the cost of inputs 
deducted uniformly from the entire harvest, despite inevitably unequal access. In 
addition, farmers cannot necessarily obtain the inputs when they need them, reducing 
their effectiveness and creating additional yield uncertainty. "Leakage" of inputs 
reduces the intended impact on the cotton crop, and the scheme's critics argue that 
there is potential for rent-seeking behaviour at all levels. The scheme is institutionally 
complicated and costly (some of these costs are currently borne by CDO, with World 
Bank support). 
A priori these ingredients would not seem to offer a promising outcome. Yet it is 
useful to compare the "with" and "without" input scheme situations - since the ideal 
conditions for rational decisions on the use of inputs clearly do not apply, nor are 
approached, in Uganda. Box 2 demonstrates how the input scheme does, despite all 
its imperfections, actually improve many of the conditions for input use and 
productivity - albeit as a stop-gap arrangement pending the development or 
emergence of more equitable, lower cost and sustainable systems. (The information in 
the box is based on the situation thought to prevail - notwithstanding the 
unacceptably high number of alleged incidents where the scheme does not operate in 
the manner intended). 
13 CDO and UGEA state erroneously that the cost of inputs is met 50:50 by ginners and farmers, and 
the seed cotton guide price is adjusted downwards to reflect the 50% contribution by farmers. 
However, there is intense competition for seed cotton, since all the ginneries are operating well below 
capacity, and all are having to meet the costs of loans taken out for rehabilitation and modernisation. 
Farmers almost always receive more than the guide price and it appears that ginners pay as much as 
they can afford to secure their supplies of seed cotton. 
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Box 2: The effect of the input scheme on Ugandan farmers' ability to make rational 
decisions on input use 
Ideal situation Without input With input Effect of Comment 
scheme scheme scheme 
Fanner faces Yes No Negative Under scheme 
real prices for farmer faces lower 
inputs and output price ( = 
output disincentive) and 
free inputs. The 
result is that 
efficient producers 
pay more for their 
inputs whilst 
inefficient 
producers pay less 
Fanner knows Poor Better (though Positive Without input 
the technical information not necessarily scheme, thin input 
relationship impartial) markets and poor 
between inputs information information 
and output available on 
selection and 
correct use of 
inputs. Limited 
extension coverage 
Fanner knows Probably does Yes Positive Without· scheme, 
cost of input in not poor availability of 
advance inputs leads to 
uncertainty on input 
costs 
Fanner knows Knows Knows Neutral Competition for the 
cotton price in minimum price minimum price farmers' crop 
advance (rarely applies) (rarely applies) results in ginners 
bidding above the 
miide price 
Farmer can No Some farmers Positive Scheme not applied 
easily obtain can obtain uniformly; some 
and pay for inputs more farmers cannot 
inputs easily obtain inputs; inputs 
not necessarily 
available when 
needed 
Farmer can Yes Yes Neutral Ginneries under-
easily market utilised at current 
crop production levels 
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The only negative score in the box concerns price perceptions. Under the scheme, 
farmers face lower output prices and free inputs. The former shifts the demand curve 
downwards whilst the latter shifts the supply curve to the right. However, this does 
not necessarily lead to uneconomic levels of input use. Farmers do not have 
unlimited access to inputs, so cannot apply inputs to the theoretical optimal point 
(where the marginal value product would equal the cost of application i.e., until there 
is virtually no yield effect). However, there is a perverse effect on output. More 
efficient producers (from the ginning companies' perspective, these would be the 
farmers they most want to encourage) effectively pay more for their inputs (they sell 
more cotton, so face a larger deduction), whilst less efficient producers face lower 
cost inputs. · 
Figure 1 presents the information graphically. The levy on the output price lowers the 
demand curve (from D1 to Ds). At current levels of production (or even if output 
doubled), the demand curve faced by farmers is fairly elastic - since all the ginners 
are operating well below capacity, and are assumed to be paying as much as possible 
to secure a larger share of the farmers' crop. Export marketing is not likely to pose a 
constraint at the present time. The "free" inputs shift the supply curve to the right. 
The objective of the scheme is to raise output over and above what it would have been 
in the absence of the scheme (Q1). To merely match former output, the supply curve 
would have to move from S 1 to Se. At this point, per unit costs of production have 
been reduced (because of free inputs) by the value of the "wedge" (difference in price 
received). If per unit costs of production fall by more than this, the ginners will 
achieve their objective of increasing output (ceteris paribus). The greater the effect 
on production costs, the greater the increase in output. There are no empirical data on 
this- but it is not implausible that Qs (with the scheme) would exceed Qi. The input 
cost in 1998/99 was calculated at 64/- per kilogram of seed cotton, out of the guide 
seed cotton price of 330/-14. Production costs are assumed to approach sales price, at 
current yields15. Generally, cotton crops in the tropics are very susceptible to pest 
attack, so pesticides (or other control measures) are considered essential16• Moving 
from a long-established absence of pest control, and no pesticide resistance, the yield 
effect of two sprays (allowed for in the input scheme) could be expected to be 
relatively large. 
14 Referring back to the previous footnote, this price was then adjusted downwards when announced to 
fanners to take account of their 50% contribution to the input costs. In practice, many fanners were 
able to sell their crop at higher prices as ginners bid up the price to secure supplies. 
15 It is clear from discussions with fanners and extension agents that cotton production is only 
marginally profitable at the present poor yields. Tentative estimates of cotton income suggest that a Yz 
acre plot may only provide gross income (essentially returns to labour and land) of around $22. 
Moreover, cotton is regarded as labour-intensive because ofland preparation and frequent weeding. 
However, it appears that fanners are nonetheless willing to grow some cotton as part of a risk-reducing 
multi-crop strategy because: 
• they know they will be able to sell the crop for cash 
• prices, although low, are relatively predictable and stable (and do not fall below the guide 
price announced by COO at the beginning of the buying season) 
• seed cotton sales coincide with Christmas and new school year expenditures, and 
• following crops do well in fields previously planted with cotton. 
16 It is not our purpose here to explore the merits of pesticides versus other control measures. However, 
it is worth recording that part of Lira District in Uganda is a certified area of organic cotton production. 
Pest control here is largely attributed to the presence of a beneficial black ant. 
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Figure 1: Supply and Demand for cotton with and without the input scheme 
Seed 
cotton 
price 
12 
Ds 
Seed cotton quantities 
Clearly, the effect on output will be larger, the greater the difference between the fall 
in production costs and the costs of the input scheme. Some of the factors that affect 
this are listed below: 
• operating the scheme so as to minimise costs whilst maintaining standards 
• reducing sources of "leakage" such that "free" inputs reach farmers 
• improving the effectiveness of the scheme by making sure that the inputs 
are available when needed and can be applied (ie there is adequate access 
to spray pumps) 
• establishing mechanisms which reward rather than penalise the more 
efficient producers 
• assuring high levels of repayment by ginners17 
• making sure that middlemen buying seed cotton do not extract super-
normal profits, and reduce the benefit seen by farmers. 
Clearly there are several potential sources of inefficiency in the scheme, which would 
not be present in a system which permitted farmers to make their own expenditure and 
resource allocation decisions. Yet, as we have attempted to demonstrate in Box 2, it 
is unrealistic to compare the input scheme with an ideal situation that does not exist in 
Uganda at the present time. 
Unfortunately, the 64/- cost does not reflect the real cost of running the scheme. CDO 
co-ordination costs are not included, and 64/- was based on an assumed harvest of 
150,000 bales of cotton lint (in fact it turned out to be 80,000 bales). The UGEA were 
only obliged to repay 64/- per kilogram of seed cotton ginned (rather than the amount 
of the loan irrespective of the volume actually ginned). The loan, moreover, was 
obtained on concessional terms, with a government guarantee to cover the risk of non-
repayment. (Given the rather unrealistic harvest forecast, this amounted to a subsidy). 
Viewed in these terms the viability of the input scheme appears highly questionable. 
Yet, the ginners plan to take out a further loan the following season - but this time at 
commercial rates without a government guarantee. (They are also negotiating 
commercial insurance cover against crop failure caused by natural events). Moreover, 
the ginners have a lot at stake and therefore are likely to demand high standards in the 
execution of the input scheme. Whilst there is an element (some observers would say 
a large element) of teething problems at the present time, these could be expected to 
be resolved fairly rapidly under commercial pressure. 
Dependence on subsidies 
The largest of the two schemes in Zimbabwe is partly dependent on funds provided at 
low interest under a World Bank support programme - though this now constitutes a 
small proportion of the loan portfolio. As a consequence input loans are charged at 
an interest rate of25-26% (compared with commercial rates in excess of 40% and 
inflation of roughly 35% in late 1998). The smaller scheme cross-subsidises the 
programme from its other activities, and also makes use of an Agricultural Finance 
Corporation loan that is provided on concessional terms. Interest rates for farmers are 
roughly 29-30% per annum18• 
17 If a default or shortfall factor has to be included, the cost of operating the scheme is likely to increase 
in subsequent years. 
18 It is difficult to estimate a precise interest rate for both of these schemes. Both charge a flat rate, 
irrespective of the period of the loan, which varies. 
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At the present time, the degree of subsidy in the Ugandan scheme appears to be much 
more significant. It includes: uncosted inputs by CDO; a 50% subsidy in the form of 
a government guarantee (for 1998/99); and a loan that was obtained at less than 
commercial rates. For 1999/2000, the subsidy will be reduced; the ginners plan to 
obtain a commercial loan, and private insurance to cover a poor harvest caused by 
natural events (principally weather). CDO co-ordination will continue, and inputs 
left-over from the previous season (when the element of subsidy was higher) will also 
be used. In the medium-term, the CDO is supposed to fund all its activities from a 
2% cess of the value of cotton exports. This is currently unrealistic (given levels of 
cotton output) and it is implausible that this situation could be attained by the time the 
World Bank project ends in December 2000. 
Effect on seed cotton output 
It is difficult to assess the impact empirically but there are persuasive arguments in 
favour of the schemes in both countries. 
When the Zimbabwean scheme commenced in 1992/93 it was regarded as a way to 
encourage small-holder production, and maintain cotton output when large-scale 
commercial producers were shifting into other more lucrative crops. Small-holder 
production has not increased dramatically during the 90s (planted area has increased 
by about 10%) but levels have been maintained, and the small-holder share of total 
production has increased from 50% (1990/91) to 70% (1995/96). The fact that two of 
the three ginning companies consider the input programmes worthwhile is a strong 
indication that they are effective. Although only 25% of small-holders participate in 
the schemes, they are almost certainly more productive farmers, so their contribution 
to national cotton output (ie from communal farmers and large-scale commercial 
farmers) may exceed 20% (and could be more than 30%)19• 
In Uganda, extension agents suggest that in the absence of the input scheme only 20% 
of farmers would buy chemicals. Yields are very low at the present time - and 
farmers are still cautious about cotton, with many having bitter memories of the 
former voucher systems where payments were late or not honoured. Moreover, cotton 
seems to be only marginally profitable - and a reticence to use purchased inputs is 
entirely understandable. In any case, inputs are not easily available, and most farmers 
could not afford them, even if they wished to use them. Output data (Table 1) do not 
reveal any immediately obvious impact. Although the harvest improved in 1998/99, 
this was following an exceptionally poor year (the effects of El Nino compounded by 
the late realisation that farmers who were expected to pay for seed for the first time 
would not plant cotton), and the crop in 1996/97 was larger (when seed was still 
distributed free). However, as in Zimbabwe, the ginners appear convinced that the 
programme serves a useful purpose - and have demonstrated their commitment to it 
by a preparedness to take out a commercial loan for the coming season (1999/2000). 
19 All three companies recognise the need to improve access to purchased inputs, and all operate input 
purchase schemes, whereby farmers can pay for inputs for the next season's crop when they sell their 
seed cotton. It is argued that many farmers would rather do this, than take out a loan, and they benefit 
from current season input prices, which are subject to rapid inflation (though ifthe Zimbabwean dollar 
is revalued, early buyers will lose out). 
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Table 1: Seed cotton roduction in U anda 1993/94 to 1999/2000 
1993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 
1996/97 
1997/98 
1998/99 
1999/2000 
25 
35 
56 
110 
32 
82 
150-190 
Wider development impacts 
Prior to reforms 
Ginneries privatised 
Cautious supply response 
Growing confidence 
Poor harvest - El Nino 
1st year of input scheme 
Tar et insured for 120 bales onl 
The Zimbabwean schemes appear to offer considerably more potential as a 
springboard for other activities. The group approach builds farmer and community 
capacities in a nwnber of ways. There is a strong focus on extension; farmers are able 
to make their own production decisions; and are exposed to financial discipline. They 
learn to act as a group, and to deal effectively with issues that arise within the group, 
where it is in their interests to do so. Strong performers are able to borrow cash - and 
one of the cotton companies intends to wean these farmers off the scheme, and "hand 
them over" to a commercial bank wishing to expand its rural network. The training 
invested in these groups is considerable (though shared by a number of parties)- but 
the benefits are essentially long-term and far-reaching20. 
The scheme in Uganda has no such benefits. Its inherently paternalistic nature does 
nothing to build capacity - with individual farmers or groups. It is essentially a 
pragmatic, short-run response to rapidly increase the cotton harvest to match the 
sudden increase in ginning capacity. 
Sustainability 
The schemes in Zimbabwe would appear to be more sustainable because: 
• the element of subsidy is small 
• the schemes are designed to build capacity and vest responsibility with the 
farmers themselves 
• the farmers now enrolled are those who have demonstrated their ability to 
make repayments, and 
• the process permits an evolution - such that farmers can graduate into 
bank lending schemes. 
None of this is true in Uganda- yet sustainability may still be possible. It depends 
on: 
• ability to contain costs of the scheme and to run it without subsidy 
• ability to ensure that inputs reach farmers on-time 
20 The situation in Mali's important cotton sector is not dissimilar. Groups take on important functions 
relating to assembly of the crop, input distribution, and payment to individual farmers. There has been 
a long-lived and on-going training input - but the benefits to the cotton company are seen in lower and 
transferred transaction costs, whilst the fanner sees greater cash income (because cotton company costs 
are reduced) and stronger capacity to be proactive as a group on other issues relating to rural services. 
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• ability to retain farmer confidence in the scheme (largely dependent on the 
above factors) and hence political commitment to it 
• ability to reward more efficient producers.21 
The encouraging point is that whilst the ginners are footing the bill, they can be 
expected to be critical task-masters, and intolerant of inefficiency and "leakage". At 
the present time, the ginners are surprisingly committed to the scheme (surprisingly 
because the teething problems appear to have been considerable) - but over time, and 
as the element of subsidy is reduced, there should be inherent pressure from the 
ginners for a high quality operation. 
Even if the Ugandan scheme proves sustainable, its impact will be limited to cotton, 
and within that, limited to narrow specific technologies. It does not replace the 
urgent need to strengthen other processes by which farmers can improve productivity, 
and gain improved access to information and farm inputs. 
21 In Ghana, a similar scheme operated (though ginners did not compete on farm price amongst one 
another). It sought to address this problem of perverse incentives in two ways. First of all fertiliser 
was taken out of the "free input" scheme- and farmers charged directly for it; later, farmers achieving 
higher yields were paid more for their cotton (though farmers could manipulate this by presenting 
cotton produced by family or friends as their own cotton). Poulton, 1998. 
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B 3 S f d"t h ox . ummary o ere 1 sc eme pe ormance . 
Performance criteria Countries 
Zimbabwe Ue:anda 
Repayment High: 98%+ Effectively only 50% in 1st 
vear 
Farmer participation 53,000 small-holders 300,000 including many 
probably more able self-selecting resource-
farmers poor, risk averse farmers 
Efficient use of inputs No data available but Evidence of significant 
inputs likely to be used "leakage" and inputs not 
efficiently because of: necessarily available when 
• monitoring and needed in a fonn that 
extension farmers can use (ie too few 
• farmers pay for spray pumps). Perverse 
inputs incentives which 
• inputs not encourage less efficient 
significantly producers and discourage 
subsidised the more efficient. 
Dependence on subsidies Minor subsidy element Major subsidy in 1st year 
only? to be reduced in years 2 
and 3. Scheme presently 
relatively high cost- and 
may collapse in the 
absence of subsidv 
Effect on seed cotton Positive - particularly as Effect not clear - ginners 
output focus seems to be on more nonetheless confident that 
productive farmers scheme is necessarv 
Wider development Capacity-building with Wider impacts are limited 
impacts farmers and groups, - inherently paternalistic 
empowennent scheme, with benefits 
related directly to any 
increased income accruing 
to farmers 
Sustainability Appears sustainable: Questionable - unless 
• subsidy is small costs can be significantly 
• capacity- reduced, inputs more 
building focused on intended 
• demonstrated beneficiaries, and 
ability to repay dependence on subsidy 
• process permits reduced 
further 
development 
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4. Input credit for small-holders: wider lessons and discussion 
In post-liberalisation Africa, there has been considerable reflection on private sector 
reticence to provide services previously provided by the state. One of the areas that 
has suffered is small-holder access to inputs and credit. However, our research in 
Uganda and Zimbabwe illustrates that there are some very considerable successes -
with very high farmer participation - that are significantly funded by the private 
sector (and are unarguably a private sector initiative). Although both of these case 
studies focus on cotton, a number of more generic lessons can be drawn. We consider 
these under three ~eadings below: 
• incentives for private traders/processors to offer farmers production credit 
• why farmers would participate in such schemes 
• factors which influence credit scheme viability. 
Incentives for private traders/processors to offer farmers production credit 
The main reason for offering credit is to address some kind of supply constraint: 
• assuring supplies of appropriate quality, volume, regularity and price 
• reducing costs of acquiring raw material 
• keeping markets or plant supplied at levels which assure viability, future 
market access or desired market share 
• protecting long run raw material supply. 
Small-holder credit programmes are risky and administratively onerous, and in the 
absence of any need to improve the supply of raw material (in various ways), traders 
or processors are unlikely to offer farmers production credit. 
Factors which influence farmer interest in participation in a credit scheme 
Fanner interest in credit scheme participation will be influenced by: 
• perception of benefits derived from use of inputs and market access 
• scheme offers better/cheaper/easier access to inputs and/or credit 
• farmer operates in context where s/he is able to plan ahead and 
willing/able to take some risk 
Unfortunately, where there is a recent history of loan amnesties and default without 
penalty, farmers may not associate participation in the scheme with an obligation to 
make repayments. 
(The accessibility of the scheme will also influence farmer participation, but this is 
discussed below). 
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Factors which influence credit scheme viability 
Box 4 provides a summary of the factors which influence the viability of input credit 
schemes (assuming that such schemes are operated by traders or processors interested 
in securing access to a particular crop). 
Box 4: Factors which influence viability of crop input credit schemes 
Factors/aspect Effect 
Crop market characteristics 
1. Crop purchase monopoly and no food/farm use of crop + * 
2. Possible for all buyers/users to form association and no food/farm use + * 
3. Multiple marketing channels and/or food use 
-
Input qualities 
1. Inputs provided in-kind + 
2. Limited alternative use or market for input + * 
3. Returns to input use are greatest for the crop in question + * 
CommerciaVcredit context 
1. Farmers treat farm as a business and are integrated into markets + 
2. History of loan amnesties, default without penalty, subsidised inputs -
3. Supportive legal/political/contract enforcement institutions + * 
Modus operandi of scheme 
1. Group schemes for peer pressure + 
2. Group or individual schemes backed up by monitoring/good + 
information, support staff, and ability to act 
3. Incentives for repayment and penalties for non-repayment + 
4. Appropriate incentives for field monitors/co-ordinators + 
5. Training provided to farmers - extension and business management + 
6. Developing relationship/trust/loyalty through field presence/contact + 
7. Accessibility of scheme - minimise red tape and transaction costs; + 
organise so location and timing of contact is convenient to farmers 
8. Effective and timely monitoring of input use and crop marketing + 
Note: *denotes killer assumption 
The significance of these categories, and particular aspects, is that they need not all be 
present for a scheme to work, but most schemes will need to incorporate several 
aspects to ensure a degree of success. For instance, the Ugandan cotton example 
relied on the buyers forming an association (crop market characteristic 2), but for the 
scheme to succeed it was also necessary for inputs to be provided in-kind, and to 
incorporate several measures from the modus operandi group ( eg., monitoring, 
extension and accessibility). The scheme can then function, even ifthe overall 
commercial context is weak. 
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The Zimbabwean cotton credit example indicates that even when few favourable crop 
market and input conditions are present (fertiliser and cash (!) are available on credit 
in Zimbabwe), it is nonetheless possible to develop strong and viable input schemes. 
The success of the schemes in Zimbabwe is very dependent on the presence of 
favourable conditions relating to overall commercial context, and modus operandi. 
So-called "killer assumptions" are also identified in Box 4, ie. conditions which 
would be favourable (for the operation of a credit scheme) if in place - but rarely are 
so. They include: crop purchase monopolies, which are increasingly rare; situations 
where all buyers can form an association effectively creating a crop purchase 
monopoly; inputs that have no other use or cannot be put to any other comparably 
profitable use; and supportive institutions for contract enforcement (the importance of 
which is particularly stressed by Dorward et al., 1998). The latter is included 
because although many countries may have appropriate legislation or policy, there are 
often compelling political economy, implementation and access factors that prevent 
its effective operation at local-level, or for particular groups. Also, the buyers' 
association approach may be difficult to apply in practice, because of unwillingness to 
take joint action. The fact that these favourable conditions rarely apply means that a 
viable scheme is necessarily dependent on several measures which could be described 
as best practice in lending to small-scale farmers. 
Best practice in rural credit, in company input schemes and other loan programmes 
Box 4 lists a number of carrot and stick measures (under modus operandi)..:.. which do 
not depend on unrealistic assumptions about, for instance, the ability to enforce 
contracts using legal mechanisms (which even if possible, would probably be very 
transaction costs-intensive). Their focus on groups, training, monitoring and 
incentive systems makes them initially costly - but once in place, farmers can take on 
a greater share of these costs (groups can act as crop assembly points, and distribution 
points for inputs - reducing the transaction costs inherent in reaching many small 
farmers). Moreover, these measures build group/individual capacity so that farmers 
are able to combine their knowledge of, for instance, land characteristics and 
agronomy, with information about inputs, and use this to make informed decisions 
about input use. Without this capacity building, technology packages tend to be 
inflexible (and therefore not ideal in all situations) or very costly in terms of extension 
(as seen, for instance, with some of the intensively-managed small-holder outgrower 
export horticulture schemes in Africa). Nonetheless, the implicit start-up costs, and 
the fact that the benefits are long-tenn (and also, far wider than just the crop in 
question) mean that they are only likely to be attractive to companies able to take a 
longer view. 
Such best practice mechanisms in rural lending are robust to different situations. For 
instance, they are similar to the measures used by Grameen Bank type schemes -
where inputs are not necessarily provided in-kind or targeted to a particular crop. 
This approach, moreover, yields benefits even where the marketing structure does not 
demand such an approach. (The cotton company in Mali, for instance, which has a 
crop purchase monopoly, nonetheless uses virtually all of these measures to reduce 
transaction costs and increase cotton output). There seems to be a clear lesson here 
for Uganda too: whilst it is difficult to envisage a viable alternative to the existing 
scheme given current conditions and circumstances (and this is true, despite all the 
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problems in the operation of the input scheme), it does not obviate the necessity and 
desirability of investment in longer term measures aimed at more sustainable and 
substantive improvements in small-holder productivity. At the same time, it may be 
more difficult still to get commitment to such long-term goals amongst a large group 
of companies (approximately 30), including many that have only participated 
reluctantly in the present input scheme. 
When can the buyers' association approach work? 
The possibility of creating a buyers' association seems to greatly expand the potential 
for viable commercially-provided small-holder credit. Yet, on closer examination, 
there are probably relatively few situations where this is likely to happen. In Uganda, 
it was administratively costly and time-consuming to organise such an association 
(the CDO played a key role in this, with the support of a small number oflarger 
ginners, but the smaller ginners were apparently reluctant partners). The larger 
ginners have most to lose and most to gain from an increase in cotton output. They 
were able to exert pressure on the smaller ginners via the CDO (membership of the 
Uganda Ginners and Exporters Association is compulsory) and also because the larger 
ginner exporters export some of the cotton ginned by the smaller companies. 
Moreover, all the ginners face similar problems and constraints - and no single 
company is privileged in the resources it has to tackle these issues. So although there 
are a few larger companies (which are substantially better-resourced/cushioned than 
the smaller ginners), these larger companies are on a fairly equal footing with one 
another. By contrast in Zimbabwe, a buyers' association (of just three cotton 
companies) would be relatively easy to organise - but there is less interest in 
collaboration of this type. The largest company (the former parastatal whose 
operations dwarf those of the other companies) undoubtedly has privileged access to 
information about individual farmers, farm output and repayment history. It appears 
to have judged its competitive advantage best-served by protecting this exclusive 
access to information (and devising alternative measures to combat the problems 
encountered in the wake crop marketing liberalisation). Another factor which limits 
the potential to replicate the buyers' association approach is that it will only solve the 
problem of "side-marketing" (farmers taking credit from one company and selling 
output to another) if the crop in question has no value on-farm or in local markets. 
This limits potential considerably - mostly to crops which need to be industrially 
processed (such as fibres and some oilseeds) or which are exclusively produced for 
export (such as tobacco, in some places). 
So, in summary, the potential to use the buyers' association approach to credit seems 
to depend on: 
• existence of mechanisms to exert pressure on laggards/reluctant partners 
• a fairly level playing field between buyers (ie comparability in what they 
stand to gain/lose), and 
• crop use options limited to those buyers (no food use or local marketing). 
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Lessons for governments wishing to promote private provision of smallholder credit 
The Ugandan example does provide an alternative model with application in 
situations where financial discipline and contract enforcement mechanisms are weak. 
The Ugandan Government, via CDO, played a critical role in focusing ginners' 
attention on the scope to collaborate, and in facilitating the formation of an 
association, and its initial access to funds. It has also contributed concretely through 
the co-ordination on the input distribution process. The niche for an agent such as 
CDO was probably there partly because, following liberalisation, most of the ginners 
were relatively new and inexperienced in the workings of the Ugandan cotton sector. 
In the medium-term, there should be no need for an input by CDO, or if still involved 
in input distribution, these services should be provided on strictly commercial 
grounds. However, during the initial re-establishment of cotton in Uganda, their role 
has been important, and may have application in other sectors and countries. 
Looking beyond these early stages in the rehabilitation of the Ugandan cotton sector, 
it will be important to shift to more efficient and sustainable means of increasing 
smallholder productivity. Governments can promote public/private/NGO/farmer 
partnerships that improve farmer access to purchased inputs - much as they work in 
Zimbabwe. Building farmer group capacity, as a vehicle for extension, input 
distribution, crop assembly, and participation in wider consultative processes, is a 
particularly important part of this process. 
Governments should also seek to fill research and information gaps on the use of 
purchased inputs, including combination packages which exploit synergies between 
farmer-supplied and external inputs. 
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Executive summary 
This paper is about policies and interventions to promote increased access to 
purchased inputs by smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa. It is one of a series of 
papers, targeted to a wide audience in the development community, intended to 
contribute to increased focus on poverty by informing and stimulating debate, policy 
and action amongst key players in the development process. 
Increased use of inputs in African agriculture is an important policy issue because: 
most of Africa's population lives in rural areas, and is dependent on agriculture for at 
least part of its income; in the past, increases in productivity were achieved through 
expansion of planted area, but as population pressure increases there is less scope to 
do this; few African countries have been able to keep pace with the food needs of 
growing populations, and food imports are rising steeply; much of Africa's 
agricultural production is located in vulnerable low potential areas, and even higher 
potential lands are now showing signs of environmental degradation; and reform of 
agricultural markets has left many farmers with poorer access to purchased inputs. 
Five sets of issues affecting access to inputs are explored: affordability; availability; 
information; risk and uncertainty; and the overall commercial context. Case studies 
are used to illustrate how these issues can be addressed. 
Credit is often asswned to hold the key to improved access. Different approaches to 
input credit are reviewed, and best practice measures are outlined. Other ways to 
improve affordability are also identified: timing input sales to coincide with times 
when farmers have cash; selling inputs in small pack sizes suited to small producers 
( eg seed); and lowering prices, by making cost reductions in distribution and 
marketing ( eg through bulk purchases, transport sharing arrangements, and farmers' 
groups taking on more responsibilities). 
Many consider the physical availability of inputs to be a more important constraint to 
access, with thin and unreliable rural distribution networks in most African countries. 
Innovative approaches to the development of input stockist networks are reviewed, 
illustrating what can be achieved through constructive partnerships between the 
commercial, private non-profit, farming community and government sectors. 
Information constraints are also important - be they in terms of information gaps 
(basic research on fertiliser response for instance) or information flows. Although 
farming is, to some extent, inherently risky, better information reduces uncertainty, 
enabling farmers to make informed production decisions. 
In addition to policies aimed the general development of rural economies, a number of 
more specific policy recommendations are made: avoid actions which undermine the 
development of sustainable commercial input supply networks; support input markets 
by setting standards and regulations, and providing information and training; promote 
synergistic partnerships between commercial, private non-profit, farming community 
and government sectors; and fill critical research and information gaps. 
List of abbreviations 
ADC 
ATAIN 
CBO 
CDO 
DFID 
FAO 
GDP 
!ARC 
IFDC 
IFPRI 
MALD/DAO 
NARS 
NGO 
NRI 
SSA 
UGEA 
USAID 
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Agribusiness Development Centre (Uganda) 
Agent Training and Input Network 
community-based organisation 
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Department for International Development (UK) 
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gross domestic product 
international agricultural research centre 
International Fertiliser Development Center 
International Food Policy Research Centre 
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non-governmental organisation 
Natural Resources Instititute 
sub-Saharan Africa 
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United States Agency for International Development 
Uganda Seed Project 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about policies and interventions to promote increased access to 
purchased inputs by smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This is one of a series of papers which seeks to elaborate the relationship between 
poverty, rural livelihoods and key policy areas. The papers are targeted to a wide 
audience in developing country governments, donor agencies, research institutes and 
other organisations concerned with development or governance. They are intended to 
contribute to increased focus on poverty by informing and stimulating debate, policy 
and action amongst key players in the development process. 
This publication is an output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing 
countries. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of DFID. (R7197 Crop 
Post-Harvest Research Programme). 
Improving access to purchased agricultural inputs: why it's important 
Small-holder agriculture in much of sub-Saharan Africa is essentially low..:.input low-
output. Since 1970, cereal yields in Africa have stagnated, whilst they have trebled 
in Asia, and risen by 2.5 times in Latin America. Green revolution technology has 
not been widely adopted. For instance, for all developing countries, the shares of 
cropped area devoted to modem varieties are 57% (maize), 70% (wheat), and 74% 
(rice). Of these three, maize is the crop most relevant to Africa- and only 43% of 
maize area in sub-Saharan Africa is devoted to modem varieties of maize. (Fritsche! 
et al., 1996). Moreover, crops that are important in African food systems are less 
important in other regions, and have been the subject of less research (for instance, 
sorghum and millet, roots and tubers, and cooking bananas). Fertiliser use is also 
extremely low at 9-11 kgs/hectare (Badiane and Delgado, 1995). Indian rainfed 
agriculture has three times the fertiliser applied to African crops (African 
Development Bank, 1996). Such aggregate data, moreover, conceal extreme 
variability in application: five countries account for roughly 2/3 of fertiliser 
consumption in sub-Saharan Africa (ibid). 
Increased use of inputs in African agriculture is an important policy issue because: 
• most of Africa's population lives in rural areas, and is dependent on 
agriculture for at least part of its income 
• in the past, increases in productivity were achieved through expansion 
of planted area, but as population pressure increases there is markedly 
less scope to do this 
• few African countries have been able to keep pace with the food needs 
of growing populations, and food imports are rising steeply 
• much of Africa's agricultural production is located in vulnerable low 
potential areas, and even higher potential lands are now showing signs 
of environmental degradation 
• changes in agricultural markets following structural adjUstment have 
left many farmers with poorer access to purchased inputs. 
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The pivotal role of agriculture 
Sub-Saharan Africa, more than any other region in the world, is overwhelmingly 
dependent on the agricultural sector. It accounts for a large proportion of GDP and 
exports in most countries (countries with significant mineral deposits are the only 
exception to this); it provides both direct employment and secondary employment in 
handling and processing industries; it is central to the livelihoods of the poor who are 
predominantly rural; and its development is closely linked with environmental issues 
of soil fertility, deforestation and water use. Anyone concerned with poverty in 
Africa is necessarily concerned with agriculture - because of its role in the incomes 
and consumption of the poor. 
Expansion of cultivated area 
Historically, increases in agricultural output in Africa were largely attributable to the 
expansion of cultivated area - through destruction of forest and cultivation of 
increasingly marginal areas. However, the scope to convert new lands has declined. 
For instance, the rate at which new arable land was developed in Africa (including 
North Africa) was about one third less in the 70s than it had been in the 60s - and in 
some regions the decline was much starker. In southern Africa, for instance, arable 
land development fell from about 2% per annum to around 0.5%. Reserves of good 
quality land were running out, and farmers had little incentive to expand given poor 
producer prices, labour shortages and the decline in rainfall since the mid-50s. It is 
now widely accepted that further production increases can only come (with a few 
exceptions) from more intensive production (see for example, Badiane and Delgado, 
1995, Marter and Gordon, 1996, Lipton, 1988). 
Keeping pace with food needs 
Analyses of trends in population growth, food production and incomes consistently 
emphasise growing food deficits in Africa, under most reasonable assumptions (see, 
for example, Agcaoili and Rosegrant, 1994, and Fritsche! et al., 1996). 
Population growth in Africa overtook Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1970s. 
In many African countries the 1990 population was more than three times the 1950 
figure. The raw data indicate that in SSA the countries with the highest population 
growth were Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire - where 1990 populations 
were at least 3 .6 times those in 1950 (United Nations, 1995) 1• Moreover, Africa is 
urbanising at an alarming rate. Roughly one third of the population is now urban. 
Table 1 illustrates considerable inter-country variability in urbanisation but an 
unmistakable upward trend. (Total populations are included to add perspective). 
Table 1: Urban po 1mlations in selected African countries 1950-1990 
Urban share 1950 Urban share 1990 Total population 1990 
Nigeria 10% 35% 96 million 
Ethiopia 5% 12% 47 million 
Dem Rep of Congo 19% 28% 37 million 
Kenya 6% 24% 24 million 
South Africa 43% 49% 37 million 
Tanzania 4% 21% 26 million 
1 Caution is needed in interpreting much of the population data for Africa. For many countries, current 
figures are estimates or projections based on census data from the early 1980s. 
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One of the implications of these trend~ is that if African countries are to sustain or 
improve on current levels of food self-sufficiency, agriculture labour productivity 
must continue to increase. This has happened - but not as fast as population growth, 
and not enough to feed the growing share of non-food producing consumers. For the 
population as a whole, per capita cereal production has actually fallen by about 15% 
in Africa (1992-94 production compared with 1970-72, Fritsche! et al., 1996). The 
data on other staples (notably roots and tubers) are notoriously unreliable - but it is 
implausible that growth in their output has been significantly faster. Banana yields 
have been falling in Uganda (the country where it is most important as a staple). New 
cassava varieties have been introduced - but the crop has also been affected by some 
major pests and diseases such as cassava mosaic disease. 
Low potential areas 
Much of Africa's agricultural production and rural poor are located in low potential 
areas (80% of cultivated area is low potential, according to Delgado, 1997). This 
label conceals considerable differences in the nature of low potential land but it does 
underline the challenges implicit in increasing agricultural productivity in Africa. The 
term encompasses consideration of economic, physical and technological factors -
reflecting, for instance, market access, the inherent productivity of the natural 
resource base, and use of appropriate environment saving technologies. Land 
potential can change over time. Both high potential and low potential lands may 
deteriorate through unsustainable practices, whilst infrastructure development, 
changes in production technology, and policy changes which favour domestic crops 
over imports, may improve potential. The key issues of concern here are: 
• production on low potential lands can only be sustained or increased 
with increased use of inputs 
• whilst some of those inputs may come from within the farming system, 
there is an important place for some purchased inputs (particularly 
improved varieties and some use of inorganic fertiliser) 
• economic factors which contribute to low potential (poor market 
access and low purchasing power of farmers) also limit small-holder 
ability to purchase the required inputs, whilst low and uncertain 
rainfall increases the risk associated with higher input systems. 
Structural adjustment 
Although somewhat mixed and patchy, there is growing evidence that structural 
adjustment has reduced small-holder use of purchased inputs. This can be attributed 
to various aspects of economic reform: 
• depreciation has led to increases in the domestic value of externally 
traded goods, and a relative decline in the value of non-tradeables; as a 
consequence the use of imported fertiliser on food crops is now less 
. . 
economic or even uneconomic; 
• governments have closed loss-making credit programmes and 
subsidised input schemes; 
• remote areas, once served by the parastatals, have tended to be 
neglected by private marketing agents, who have now taken over crop 
and agricultural input trade; 
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• crop prices are less predictable such that risk-averse farmers are less 
likely to use purchased inputs 
• the abolition of crop purchase monopolies has made it difficult to 
establish viable farmer credit schemes, which in the past relied on 
repayment being made when the harvest was sold, and 
• public sector spending restraint has reduced the resources available to 
extension services. 
Intensification: purchased inputs and farmer-supplied inputs 
The focus of this paper is purchased inputs. This focus is not intended to imply any 
exclusivity in this strategy to increase productivity - rather that purchased inputs, 
even in small quantities, can usefully complement other means of intensification. 
Moreover, many of the issues affecting access to purchased inputs are somewhat 
different to those that apply to farmer-supplied inputs. In addition, the conditioning 
environment in African agriculture, in which farmers take and act upon production 
decisions, has been subject to considerable recent change - making re-analysis of 
these issues an urgent priority. 
What this paper covers 
Following this introductory section, there are three sections: 
• a review of the issues affecting small-holder use of purchased inputs 
• strategies to improve small-holder access, and 
• conclusions 
In addition to the extensive literature on this topic and related issues, the paper draws 
heavily on field work and workshops conducted by NRI in Uganda and Zimbabwe in 
1998 and 1999. The purpose of this research was to identify viable private credit 
schemes that facilitate small~holder access to production inputs. Whilst the work 
confirmed the importance of credit, it pointed to a number of other constraints 
presently affecting the use of purchased inputs. It is this breadth of issues which is 
explored in this paper. 
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ISSUES AFFECTING SMALL-HOLDER USE OF PURCHASED INPUTS 
Five sets of issues are explored: 
• affordability 
• availability 
• information 
• uncertainty 
• commercial context. 
There is no prioritisation implicit in the order of the topics. Rather, they are all 
important and linked by many inter-related issues. 
Whilst some of these topics may seem obvious, they have been broken down into 
their various components - lest certain aspects of a particular constraint should be 
overlooked. In the following section, where strategies to increase the use of 
purchased inputs are explored, the importance of these components becomes clearer. 
Thus, for example, affordability can be improved by a change in the timing of sales. 
Affordability 
Many African small-holders cannot afford to buy agricultural inputs. Although this is 
a straightforward enough concept, it does encompass different dimensions . . 
Price 
At its simplest, farmers cannot afford inputs because they are too expensive. Many 
agricultural inputs have been subject to dramatic price increases - as a result of the 
removal of subsidies, price controls and currency depreciation. Gibbon (1992) 
reports that under structural adjustment in Ghana, fertiliser and pesticide price rises 
exceeded inflation by a factor of five or six. In some cases, the price structure and 
yield response is such that the use of certain inputs may no longer be justified on 
crops produced for the domestic market - but whether or not this is the case, most 
African small-holders have very limited purchasing power, and agricultural inputs 
represent a major outlay. 
Whilst there is no doubt some profiteering by traders, there are many other factors 
which contribute to inherently high costs in delivering inputs to fanning areas, under 
the market and infrastructure conditions prevailing at the present time. These factors 
include: 
• low volume imports - so less discount for bulk purchases and higher 
per unit transport costs (the latter is particularly true ofland-locked 
countries) 
• dispersed local markets making low volume purchases, in a tightly 
concentrated seasonal window - which all contribute to high costs per 
unit of input 
• poor roads and telecommunications, and transport bottlenecks 
(including the operation of transport cartels) increase transaction costs, 
and 
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• payment of bribes in order to obtain timely import clearance on 
seasonal inputs. 
Transaction costs 
Closely related to price, are the cash costs involved in input purchase other than the 
price of the input itself (there are other costs too, including the time needed to find 
about and source inputs). Purchase may require the farmer to travel to a local (or 
distant) town, necessitating expenditure on transport and accommodation; it may 
require phonecalls (where these are possible); or even signing up for a larger package 
which includes unwanted inputs (some farmers in Uganda apparently sign up for seed 
and fertiliser packages available through development projects, simply to obtain the 
seed, which is in short supply). 
Unit size 
Some inputs would be more affordable if they were available in smaller pack sizes 
(notwithstanding the additional packaging costs). African farmers tend to plant small 
areas; they plant many crops, and they intercrop. When they try out new seed they 
often only want small quantities initially - and may still demand modest quantities of 
seed which is known to them. Obvious though this may be, inputs such as seed are 
often not available in sufficiently small pack sizes. Even purpose-built seed handling 
systems may not have appropriate pack size capacity. (For example, the Uganda Seed 
Project, a parastatal concerned with small-holder seed provision, has the capacity for 
25kg and 1 Okg seed packs. In an attempt to respond to farmer needs, they fill 5kg and 
2kg packs manually, but recognise that pack sizes of lkg and 500g would be better 
still). Whilst retail outlets, projects or farmers may split packs, this always calls into 
question seed quality guarantees. 
Credit 
Although credit may theoretically provide a solution to low purchasing power, 
Africa's small-holders are notoriously ill-served by formal credit mechanisms. Banks 
regard farmers as high risk and high cost (because of the small size of individual 
transactions) and tend to have very poor rural networks. Former loss-making state-
supported schemes have been closed, along with the schemes run by parastatals that 
had crop purchase monopolies. Although some NGOs and other organisations are 
trying to develop sustainable farmer lending methodologies, there are few good 
examples, and farmer participation in such schemes is the exception rather than the 
rule. Informal sources of credit are no doubt important - particularly from friends and 
family - but inadequate, since expenditure patterns follow a similar seasonal pattern 
in rural areas, with everyone's need arising at the same time. 
Timing of income and expenditure 
Cash flow is important - and the timing of expenditure may be a crucial determinant 
of affordability. In poor households there is intense demand for scarce cash 
resources, and a prior crisis may eat into resources otherwise ear-marked for 
important agricultural inputs. In Zimbabwe the cotton companies sell next season 
inputs when they purchase seed cotton, knowing that farmers have the resources to 
make purchases at that time. Similarly, in Uganda, farmers grow cotton despite its 
questionable profitability, and it seems that the timing of crop sales, which coincide 
with Christmas and new school year expenditures, is an important consideration. 
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Household decisions on expenditure 
The decision to purchase inputs for a particular crop may be influenced by access to 
cash within the household and traditional domains of decision-making. Whilst men 
are often involved in the production and marketing decisions concerning traditional 
cash crops, women tend to play a greater role in the production and marketing of food 
crops. They may find that their husbands do not attach a priority to input needs on 
these crops whilst their own resources may be too stretched to extend to input 
purchase. 
Availability 
Even when households can afford inputs, they may be unavailable. Again, there are 
several aspects to this. 
Small domestic markets and low volume imports 
Despite large numbers of farmers, many African countries represent very small 
markets for agricultural inputs - largely because of low purchasing power. Thus 
many inputs may not be available in the country simply because the volumes that can 
be sold are very small. This is less of an issue in, for example, Kenya, where small-
holders and estates make high use of inputs, than, say, Uganda, where the estate sector 
is small and small-holders generally have very low purchasing power. (Kenya's 
imports of fertiliser were 150,000 tonnes in 1998, compared with only 10,000 tonnes 
in Uganda. Magnay, 1999). 
Availability of specific formulae 
Consideration of aggregate availability may conceal some important distinctions. 
Fertiliser may not be available in the appropriate formulae, for instance, or important 
complementary inputs may not be available, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the 
overall package. (In Uganda, although chemicals were distributed to cotton farmers, 
too few had access to the spray pumps needed to apply them). 
Timeliness 
Farming is a highly seasonal activity- and inputs are needed at very specific times. 
Some peak needs can be anticipated (seed at planting time for instance - even if 
planting dates shift depending on rainfall), whilst others arise at short notice (the 
sudden emergence of a pest requiring rapid action to save the crop). Where inputs 
need to be imported at short notice, it is unlikely that the market can respond in time -
and even where it is a question of distributing inputs from the capital to rural areas, 
information and transport constraints may prevent a sufficiently timely response. 
Distribution networks 
For the farmer, the non-availability of inputs often manifests itself in the first instance 
in the absence of local agricultural input retailers. Farmers must generally travel 
some distance to locate inputs (sometimes to the capital) with no guarantee of 
success or affordability. Moreover, where input needs arise at short notice during the 
planting season, there is an especially high premium on the farmer's time, making the 
uncertainty and absence of local outlets all the more problematic. 
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Information 
Information constraints arise at different levels. 
Yield response to inputs under farmer conditions 
The information constraint is first of all apparent in the straightforward lack of 
reliable information on yield response to, for instance, fertiliser, under the conditions 
and soils prevailing in farmers' fields. Stakeholders participating in the NRI 
workshops stressed this lack of information in small-holder systems as different as 
those in Zimbabwe and Uganda. Under certain conditions, and for some inputs, the 
research has been done - but it is not easily accessible. Nor would it seem that these 
are areas on which an informed consensus view can be easily reached, given the 
widely differing views expressed at the workshops. 
Extension services 
Even assuming that the information exists, it may not easily reach farmers. Extension 
services in many countries have been hit hard by public sector budgetary constraints -
leaving many workers with their salaries paid but no funds to visit farmers. In many 
cases they are doing the best they can in difficult circumstances, but certain problems 
are widespread: 
• bias towards less poor farmers, men and accessible farmers 
• lack of printed extension material available in local languages 
• messages not suited to conditions which prevail in farmers' fields, and 
• inflexibility in adapting messages to farmer needs. 
Other sources of information 
As a consequence farmers rely heavily on information available from other sources: 
• friends and family 
• farmers with privileged access to information - those involved in trials, 
demonstration plots, seed multiplication or contract farming, for 
instance 
• NGOs and development projects 
• farmers' groups and associations 
• radio and newspaper 
• traders and purchasers of farmer crops 
• farm input retail outlets (where they exist) 
• information provided with the product. 
The first four are likely to have very piecemeal information- expanding the farmer's 
knowledge, but with no certainty that s/he has sufficient information on which to 
make a well-informed choice between technologies or inputs. 
Mass media may, in some countries, provide targeted farmer information services -
but in many countries provision for farming communities is very weak. 
Traders can be a good source of information on preferred varieties - and may actually 
get to see enough farmers to gain an understanding of problem remedies that work. 
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Companies buying particular products - or running contract farmer schemes - are 
more likely to have knowledgeable field agents. 
In an ideal world, retail outlets would offer comprehensive impartial advice on the 
farm inputs available. Too often, however, the temptation to tout particular products 
is too high - and in many areas there is no alternative supplier to which the farmer can 
tum for a second opinion. (Recent work by NRI in India suggests, plausibly enough, 
that where retailers are farmers themselves, and located within the farming 
community, they are more likely to offer impartial advice). Where products are 
retailed in their original packaging, information provided with the product is likely to 
comply with international information standards (giving the active ingredients, 
intended use, recommended rates and methods of application, and shelf-life) but again 
may be in an inaccessible form (written in small dense print, in a non-native language, 
using technical terms). Its inaccessibility may extend to the retailer as well as the 
farmer. 
Price information 
An informed decision on the use of purchased inputs also requires information on 
prices, and in thin markets, prices can be particularly uncertain and variable. 
Likewise the transaction costs incurred in locating the input. Again, stakeholders at 
the NRI workshops in Zimbabwe and Uganda considered this an important issue 
affecting small-holder access to purchased inputs. 
Safe use of chemicals 
Farmers need information on the safe use of chemicals - and the means of compliance 
with such recommendations. Whilst development projects stress these aspects, and 
international companies "cover" themselves with the information they supply with 
their products, the reality is that farmers are often unaware of particular risks - or may 
be unable to apply the input in the recommended manner (making use of protective 
clothing for instance). 
Quality criteria 
Another issue which arose at the NRI workshops concerned the standards 
set/regulated by the public sector, and farmer (/retailer) needs for information on how 
to assess input quality where such standards do not exist or are unreliable. This 
applied particularly to seed viability - and arose in the context of government plans to 
privatise seed production and sales units. 
Risk and uncertainty 
Farmer willingness to purchase inputs is also affected by risk and uncertainty. 
Weather risk 
Low and uncertain rainfall is closely linked to low use of purchased inputs, since it 
creates additional yield risk. Most African agriculture is rainfed. Only 8% of cereal 
production is irrigated, compared with 20-40% in other developing regions. 
Market risk 
Where output prices are very volatile, farmers may be unwilling to apply inputs for 
fear that they may not cover costs. Maize prices in Uganda are a case in point. They 
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are subject to major swings on account of large, lumpy, unpredictable relief purchases 
for neighbouring countries. Some years, maize is a highly profitable crop for farmers, 
whilst in other years, other crops offer much better returns. 
Input quality or suitability 
The quality and suitability of a particular input is a further source of uncertainty. 
Chemicals, in particular, are often very specific and very expensive - and farmers will 
be reluctant to apply them unless confident of their suitability. Unviable seeds are 
another problem. Whilst suppliers may willingly replace or refund when this 
happens, planting has to be repeated and the ideal sowing date has passed. 
Export market concern with the use of inputs 
Some farmers are aware of northern market concerns about the use of chemicals, and 
in some countries there may be a small local market for organic products. Organic 
export schemes are beginning to spring up in developing countries - in some cases 
merely putting a more profitable label on long established practices. This may add to 
farmer uncertainty on the use of purchased inputs - particularly inorganic fertiliser, 
chemicals and GM crops - because of his/her concern to be able to market the crop, 
or because of concern over local environmental harm. 
Commercial context 
There are a number of ways in which the overall commercial context affects the use 
of purchased inputs. These issues overlap with some of the other topics already 
discussed, but as a group they offer an additional explanation for overall levels of 
input use. These issues were highlighted particularly by stakeholders at the workshop 
in Uganda - where most farmers were characterised as operating partly or largely in a 
non-commercial way, with important exceptions arising in areas bordering Kenya, 
where marketing is easier, and has taken place without disruption for a much longer 
period than is typical elsewhere in strife-tom Uganda. 
Output marketing and price expectations 
Farmers' expectations of being able to market their crop at a remunerative price are an 
important determinant of willingness to use purchased inputs. Although market prices 
may vary, some will be subject to larger swings than others (the Ugandan maize 
example, for instance). With sufficient experience, farmers may nonetheless develop 
technology strategies which are robust in the face of expected price variation, or 
where resources permit may be able to take a calculated risk on the likelihood of 
covering costs. 
Financial discipline 
Where debt amnesties and subsidised credit programmes have been common, it may 
be more difficult to establish viable credit schemes than in situations where those 
taking out loans expect to repay them. Viable credit schemes need to have the 
capacity to impose penalties, but if these become the norm rather than the exception, 
the cost of enforcing repayment may become excessive. Small-holder credit schemes 
in Uganda and Zimbabwe provide contrasting evidence of financial discipline. In the 
former, there are few examples of viable farmer credit schemes, with strategic default 
common. A private scheme mounted by one of the cotton companies found that 
although they had planned to seize assets in the event of default, this was socially and 
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politically impossible to enforce. In Zimbabwe, however, the private cotton 
companies have managed to enforce such measures and have achieved very high 
repayment rates of 98%+ (although interestingly the state-run Agricultural Finance 
Corporation has suffered high rates of default among the fanners it deals with). 
Rural traders 
Many parts of rural Africa are poorly connected to local towns, and poorly served by 
specialist retail outlets, crop traders and transport networks. Although fanning is the 
single most important source of livelihood in most rural areas, it is often extremely 
difficult to obtain fann inputs. In recognition of this, government offices (often 
extension units), NGOs, and projects, may market some inputs. The absence of retail 
outlets is not limited to fann inputs. It affects all sectors, and reflects the limited 
purchasing power of fanning communities. 
Critical mass and transaction costs 
When taken together, these factors which reduce access to inputs, combine to create 
an additional disincentive: high and unpredictable transaction costs. Trading in small 
quantities, to dispersed markets, with irregular, seasonal demand, contributes to high 
transaction costs (low volume transactions incurring the same fixed "negotiation" 
costs as those for higher volumes, higher transport costs than could be negotiated for 
regular or larger shipments, lack of competitive pressure). High transaction costs 
incurred by the trader translate into higher retail prices, and in addition to these, 
transaction costs incurred by the fanner contribute to uncertainty and conflict with 
alternative use of his/her time and resources. 
Farming as a business 
In Uganda, it is often argued that years of civil strife made many fanners adopt low 
risk, food self-sufficient fanning strategies. In this context, fanning was not really a 
business - more a means of producing food for the household, subject to certain 
constraints. Although most parts of Uganda are now more secure, commercial sector 
development is only taking place slowly. Yet where increased pressure on land 
necessitates greater use of purchased inputs, it is useful to emphasise the business 
aspect of fanning - because it is only within this financial and trading context that 
farmers are likely to recognise that careful use of selected purchased inputs is a viable 
strategy. The situation in Uganda is probably more extreme than that experienced in 
many countries, but the principle nonetheless has wide application. Fanner 
willingness to use purchased inputs depends in part on the overall commercial 
environment, including the extent to which fanning decisions are influenced by 
business (profitability) criteria. 
13 
IMPROVING ACCESS: RECENT EXPERIENCE AND BEST PRACTICE 
The purpose of this section is to provide readers with a menu of practical ways in 
which constraints to purchased input access can be addressed. Drawing on recent 
(90s) African experience, the material is presented in two main sub-sections: 
• the use of credit to improve access to purchased inputs 
• mechanisms to improve input access that do not rely on credit 
These different approaches were developed as a response to different country and 
farmer circumstances - and each has its strengths and weaknesses. 
The section concludes with an assessment of the extent to which the various 
approaches reviewed address the five issues discussed in the previous section: 
affordability, availability, information, risk and uncertainty, and commercial context. 
Using credit to improve access to purchased inputs 
Four approaches are discussed: 
• contrasting cotton farmer credit schemes used in (1) Uganda and (2) 
Zimbabwe 
• intensively managed outgrower schemes, and 
• extending banking services to small-holders 
Cotton companies taking a joint loan to provide inputs for farmers in Uganda 
Liberalisation of the cotton sector in Uganda led to substantial private investment in 
ginning. Ginning capacity greatly exceeded the cotton harvest. Farmers, who had 
bitter memories of low state-controlled cotton prices and an unreliable voucher 
payment system, were unwilling or unable to buy inputs (even seed). Whilst the cash 
payments made by the privatised ginneries were gradually attracting more farmers 
back into cotton, this alone seemed insufficient to boost output as rapidly as the 
ginners hoped. The initial response by one of the larger ginneries was to launch an 
ill-fated input credit scheme (for seed and pesticides). The scheme proved disastrous 
as the majority of smallholders defaulted on their loans, due to a combination of side-
selling (avoiding repayment of loans by selling to another ginner) and a poor harvest 
(it was the El Nino year). It proved impossible to enforce the purchase agreements, 
and attempts to seize assets proved unworkable. 
In order to remove the possibility of side-selling, the Uganda Ginners and Exporters 
Association (UGEA) was formed, with compulsory membership of all cotton ginners. 
For the 1998/1999 season the UGEA financed the input credit scheme from a Bank of 
Uganda loan, guaranteed by the Ugandan Government. The Cotton Development 
Organisation (CDO), a parastatal formed when the sector was liberalised to provide 
co-ordination and regulatory services, played a critical role in the development and 
operation of the input credit scheme. The CDO has co-ordinated the distribution of 
cottonseed and pesticides. Smallholders are free to sell their seed cotton to any ginner. 
The ginners are responsible for loan repayment, and these costs are met through a 
levy payable against volumes of cotton ginned by each ginner. (Volumes are assessed 
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by independent monitors assigned to each ginnery). Average (not individual) input 
costs are factored into the seed cotton price paid to farmers (and all farmers, bar those 
registered in an organic scheme, receive the same cotton price irrespective of the 
quantity of inputs supplied to the individual farmer). Side-selling is prevented by 
removing the option of selling to alternative buyers: all ginners are members of the 
UGEA so it is impossible for a farmer to sell cotton to buyers outside the scheme. 
Levy avoidance by individual ginners has been reduced by the presence of monitors 
in the ginneries, and dialogue with border officials and spinning factories, where 
ginners (or farmers) may try to make illegal sales. 
The scheme is certainly not problem-free and suffers from: 
• difficulties assuring the timeliness of input delivery 
• diversion of inputs by intermediaries responsible for their distribution, or 
attempts to charge farmers for the inputs at the point of delivery 
• inputs given out to non-cotton farmers and cotton farmers going without 
• farmers using the inputs on other crops, or selling them 
• too few spray pumps with which to apply the chemicals 
• farmers cannot make their own production decisions based on real prices 
• all farmers selling cotton to the ginners pay equally for the cost of the 
scheme (through the seed cotton price) irrespective of individual input use 
• critics contend that the scheme is vulnerable to rent-seeking at all levels 
Moreover, the sustainability of the scheme is in question on account of: the element 
of subsidy (its first year of operation turned out to be heavily subsidised by the 
Government guarantee because the levy on cotton volumes ginned was based on an 
over-optimistic harvest forecast, plus CDO's own co-ordination inputs are currently 
provided without charge to the industry); the absence of capacity-building to help 
farmers make appropriate production decisions; and "leakage" of inputs which may 
threaten the intended impact on output. Yet for the next year, the ginners plan to take 
out a commercial loan, with private crop insurance to cover a shortfall due to natural 
disaster- and this "stake" should provide inherent pressure (on CDO) for a higher 
quality (less leaky) operation. 
A scheme with so many problems cannot be described as a model-yet it is an 
interesting example of a pragmatic stop-gap measure to increase farmer productivity. 
Its coverage is impressive - around 300,000 small-holders who are, to a certain 
extent, self-selecting resource-poor farmers (because although now low-risk, cotton is 
not very profitable, and therefore unattractive to farmers with other choices or able to 
bear more risk). The challenges are essentially two-fold: to improve on the operation 
so that the benefits are maximised whilst containing the cost; and to simultaneously 
build longer-term farmer capacity through extension and group activities. 
Cotton companies in Zimbabwe providing inputs on credit to farmers. 
In contrast to Uganda, there has been no co-operation between the three ginning 
companies in Zimbabwe, although all rely to some extent on small-holder cotton 
production. Two of the companies operate input credit schemes. Both companies 
have a similar approach for overcoming the problem of side-selling: 
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• All borrowers belong to groups of cotton smallholders. Default by one member of 
the group brings retribution to the whole group, which may be subsequently 
excluded from the scheme. This increases incentives to repay. It also encourages 
group members to monitor and help one another to ensure that there is no default. 
• Groups performing well receive cash rewards. 
• If defaulting occurs, the companies act swiftly and come down heavily on 
defaulters, seizing assets when necessary. 
• Local agents of the cotton companies are in year-round contact with smallholders, 
building closer relationships and a sense of loyalty to the company. 
• Additional services are provided in addition to the input credit: extension advice 
is provided, and one company has recently introduced cash loans. Again, these 
additional benefits of "belonging" to a company help to strengthen relationships 
and loyalty. 
Individual farmer participation in the input scheme depends on repayment records, 
acceptance by other members of the group, and the achievement of a certain minimum 
yield. Around 25% or 50,000 small-holder cotton farmers participate in the schemes, 
and in contrast to the Ugandan situation, these tend to be the more able farmers. The 
schemes are intended to help such farmers expand production, whilst other farmers 
are expected to make cash payments for inputs. 
Schemes in both countries are still in their infancy. In Uganda, the performance of 
the UGEA scheme cannot be fully judged because it has only been running_ for one 
season. Box 1 compares the performance of the two schemes based on the information 
currently available. One interesting conclusion is that although the Uganda scheme is 
far from being a model farmer credit scheme, its coverage (and in particular, its ability 
to reach poorer farmers) is extremely impressive. The Zimbabwean schemes may 
represent best practice in credit delivery, but the beneficiaries are principally (and 
deliberately) the more able farmers. 
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Judgement criteria Countries 
Zimbabwe U!!anda 
Repayment 1997/1998 season repayment rates for Only 50% of input loan repaid (see 
the two schemes were: 98% and footnote) 
100% 
Coverage 1998/1999 season (both schemes): For 1998/1999 season. 
53,000 smallholders Cottonseed distributed to around 
This represents about 25% of small- 300,000 smallholder farmers, typically 
holder cotton farmers - generally farming on small unirrigated plots. 
farming on communal or resettled The scheme is intended to reach all 
land ( small plots, unirrigated, and cotton farmers (except those enrolled in 
typically on marginal land). a separate organic scheme) 
Efficient use of Although no data are available, inputs Again, no data are available. However, 
inputs are likely to be used efficiently. inputs are free at the point of delivery 
• Input use is closely monitored to farmers, with the cost deducted 
and extension advice is provided. uniformly from farmgate prices -
• Farmers pay for inputs so have regardless of the volume of inputs 
good reason to use them wisely supplied to individual farmers. This 
• Inputs are supplied at cost price weakens the incentive to use inputs 
(cheaper than local market prices efficiently. To combat this, monitoring 
due to bulk buying by cotton and extension advice is provided - but 
companies and no retail margin). reports of diversion of inputs and late 
delivery were widespread. 
Subsidies One scheme includes a small element UGEA used donor funds loaned at 
of concessional funds from a former below market interest rates - backed 
World Bank loan at below market up by a Government guarantee. 
interest rates, whilst the other scheme 
is partly reliant on low interest Agric CDO do not charge for the logistics 
Finance Corporation loans support provided (Govt/donor funds 
used for this) 
UGEA's inability to repay loan 
amounts to 50% subsidy2 
Contribution to Small-holder credit contributes to Production credit almost certainly a 
cotton sector increased production - but significant critical component in cotton sector 
development numbers of producers do not use it recovery. UGEA plan to continue 
scheme with commercial loan and 
insurance cover. 
Wider development Potential to expand financial services Whilst cotton production may increase 
impacts available to cotton farmers ( eg farmer incomes, the present input 
savings schemes)-with wider scheme does not contribute to wider 
development impacts farmer benefits relating to eg., group 
Group approach helps build capacity- building and financial 
community-level capacities discipline 
2 Repayments were calculated on a per kg of seed cotton ginned basis, and assumed an improbably 
large harvest of 150,000 bales. The use of this figure (rather than a more realistic estimate) made the 
scheme more attractive to ginners, and politically easier to sell to farmers (to the extent that they had 
any voice in this). In the event a harvest of only half this amount was achieved, with the Government 
guarantee effectively providing a 50% subsidy on the loan taken out by ginners (ie meeting half the 
repayment costs - both interest and principle). 
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Zimbabwe 's experience with intensively managed outgrower schemes 
The term "outgrower scheme" is often reserved to describe schemes where the agri-
business has considerable control over the smallholder production process, providing 
a large number of services, such as input credits, tillage, spraying and harvesting. The 
smallholder provides land and labour in return for this comprehensive extension/input 
package. The high value horticultural export sector is currently the focus of 
considerable outgrower scheme development (for example Hortico in Zimbabwe and 
Homegrown in Kenya). 
European supermarkets are the main market for horticultural exports from sub-
Saharan Africa. Quality requirements are exacting in terms of physical appearance 
and food safety, which in turn requires highly developed technical and managerial 
production skills. In addition, the supermarkets need to be able to trace produce back 
to the grower. Together, this implies a very close working relationship between the 
farmer and the exporter, and a sophisticated system for providing agricultural 
services. In these schemes, the high cost of the service provided by the company 
involved is justified by the high value of the final product. 
Hortico in Zimbabwe operates an outgrower scheme producing and exporting 
babycom and mange-tout beans to the European market. Success has been achieved 
by establishing a thorough supervisory system and rigid enforcement of standards. By 
early 1999, 3,000 farmers were contracted to sell their produce to Hortico at a price 
guaranteed at the beginning of the crop cycle. Sixty percent of participating farmers 
are women. The amount grown by each farmer is restricted. This ensures that 
production of other crops is not neglected, whilst adequate attention is devoted to the 
export crop. Training, technical support, inputs and spraying are provided by the 
company, and farmers provide labour, land and irrigation (using watering cans). 
Contact between the company and the farmer is frequent - a lorry visits each farmer 
every second day. This reduces the possibility of side-selling. Cost recovery on inputs 
is nearly 100 percent. 
Close monitoring of farm operations, a high level of technical support, and frequent 
contact with the smallholders, are required to operate outgrower schemes 
successfully. There may be scope for increased use of producer groups to reduce costs 
of the schemes and allow some of the services provided by the company to be 
assumed by the group. Such schemes allow smallholders to participate in high value 
export sector development, producing very specific products to exacting standards, 
whilst export companies find that the labour-intensive nature of some of the crops is 
ideally suited to small unit operations. 
Piloting rural banking services in Uganda 
In 1998 Uganda's Centenary Bank commenced a pilot scheme targeting financial 
services to smallholders. The scheme is currently operated at one branch only 
(Mbale ), though if successful it will eventually be extended to all their branches 
(currently 12, though planned to increase to 24 by 2002). 
The underpinning philosophy of the bank is that the emphasis should be on the ability 
of the borrower to repay a loan, rather than security of the loan. In other schemes 
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where loan security has been the over-riding concern, mechanisms such as group-
lending have been used so that peer pressure can substitute for collateral. Regular and 
frequent repayment instalments are another means by which loan security (ie 
repayment of the loan) can be safe-guarded. 
The Centenary approach places the emphasis on ability to repay. Loans are made 
against a projected cash flow. Household budget analysis is key: after the initial 
application, a Bank Field Officer visits the household to carry out an analysis of 
household income and expenditure, based on all income (on-farm and off-farm), and 
all household expenditures. From this, an estimate of household cash flow, with and 
without a loan, can be made. Loans are made when it is clear that the loan can be 
repaid. Repayment terms are then tailored to fit the cash flow analysis. The field 
officers are qualified agronomists who have also been trained in rural finance. As 
such, they are able to recognise the agricultural potential of a farm, and judge the 
profitability of the activities that will contribute to loan repayment. 
Although security is not the basis on which the loan is made, a variety of tools are 
used to at least partially secure the loan: guarantors; land titles (including those for 
customary tenure); post-dated cheques (it is a criminal offence to have a cheque 
bounced in Uganda); seizure of assets; and using standing crops as collateral. 
In Uganda the scheme is particularly innovative, because recent experience with loan 
schemes has been very poor. (Civil war, free input schemes, and frequent loan 
amnesties have been blamed for this). Early indications are that the scheme is viable 
- and will be extended to other parts of Uganda. 
Improving access to purchased inputs without using credit 
Credit is so often considered a key issue in expanding small-holder access to farm 
inputs, that a surprising result of the NRJ research and workshops in Uganda and 
Zimbabwe, was the wealth of experience with schemes which deliberately avoid such 
an approach. 
Six approaches are described here: 
• a seed and fertiliser hand-out scheme in Malawi 
• a scheme to sell inputs when farmers have available cash in Zimbabwe 
• tailoring seed services to farmers' needs in Uganda 
• strengthening the informal seed systems 
• strengthening commercial input distribution networks in Uganda, and 
• public/private partnerships in farm inputs and extension in Zimbabwe 
The Malawi Starter Pack Scheme 
The packs are intended to meet a short-term food security need and address the 
longer-term issue of declining soil fertility. They are a response to growing food 
deficits and poverty in Malawi, and fertiliser which is too expensive for most farmers 
following the economic reforms of the 80s and 90s. The packs contain cereal and 
legume seed, and fertiliser. Each rural household receives one pack, enough for 0.1 
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ha or 60-1 OOkg of additional maize. The scheme is an initiative of the Malawi 
Government and donors. 
The scheme commenced in 1998, with the distribution of2.53 million packs. The 
actual cost of the project was $25.12 million (approximately 70% more than 
anticipated). The distribution of the packs (involving government agents as well as 
contracted services from private transport companies and NGOs) worked well with 
relatively few problems considering the scale of the operation and the time available. 
Preliminary findings (Kate Longley, personal communication) indicate that few 
households followed the instructions to plant a 0.1 ha plot with seed and fertiliser. The 
instructions were written in Chichewa, and not understandable by non-Chichewa 
readers or non-literate people. Where farmers chose not to use fertiliser or seed, this 
was more due to the view that fertiliser was unnecessary or the seed inappropriate to 
the location than the desire to sell the inputs. The groundnut seeds were regarded as 
being of poor quality and seldom planted. Where they were, germination was poor. 
Government field assistants did not provide much advice to smallholders. A lot of 
their time was spent in registration and distribution, which interrupted normal 
activities. 
The incremental yields appear to be between 60 and 80 kg. Highly variable output 
prices make it difficult to put a precise value on this output but preliminary 
indications are that the return on the cost of the pack is only 1: 1. In spite of its longer-
term objectives of the gradual (over 5 - 10 years) spread of improved techriologies 
among smallholder farmers, the starter pack scheme is largely perceived as a free 
inputs scheme, and a short-term safety net. 
Selling cotton inputs in Zimbabwe when farmers have sufficient cash 
In Zimbabwe three companies buy and gin smallholder cotton. The smallest of the 
three does not operate an input credit scheme, and has no plans to do so. Company 
officials consider input credit unnecessary because their supply requirements can be 
met from large-scale producers and from smallholders outside the other companies' 
input credit schemes. In addition, they wish to avoid the significant administrative 
burden they perceive from operating such a service. Instead of being offered credit, 
farmers can purchase inputs for the following season when they sell their seed cotton, 
with no obligation to sell them the next season's crop. Such a system has the 
advantage of not indebting smallholders, who in the current economic climate (in 
November 1998 annual inflation was 35%, and market interest rates were over 40%) 
may be reluctant to take credit for fear of long term indebtedness. High inflation also 
makes advance purchase of inputs attractive to those farmers who can afford to do so. 
Tailoring seed services to farmers' needs in Uganda 
The Uganda Seed Project (USP) is a parastatal established in the 1960s to meet small-
holder seed requirements. Its operations include extensive contract farmer seed 
multiplication schemes, quality assurance and seed distribution. It concentrates on 
maize and beans - although smaller volumes of other grains and oilseeds are also 
supplied. As of 1999, plans are being made to privatise a large part of its operations. 
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In the run-up to privatisation there has been considerable analysis of the problems it 
has faced and the implicit challenge to a new owner. 
There are about 2.5 million farm families in Uganda who must use seed from one 
source or another. The vast majority of them are small-scale farmers. Uganda's agro-
ecological conditions permit the cultivation of a diverse range of crops. Theoretically 
this should offer enormous opportunities for seed companies. In practice, however, 
the use of improved seeds has eluded the majority of farmers. Of the estimated 
annual seed requirement for maize (10,000 tonnes) and beans (90,000 tonnes) only 
15% and 1 % respectively are supplied by the formal seed sector. Box 2 summarises 
the issues confronting USP in meeting farmer demand. 
Box 2: What farmers need from seed suppliers 
Technical effectiveness I. good performance under farmer conditions/constraints 
2. known response under different weather patterns or in 
different agro-climatic zones 
Reliable quality I. quality often not obvious until crop maturity/harvest so 
quality assurance particularly important 
2. genetic quality hard to guarantee with old varieties 
(used in Uganda for beans and groundnuts) - requires 
deliberate, rigorous maintenance breeding scheme 
3. need robust systems to assure physical and 
physiological quality 
4. inefficient delivery systems, poor infrastructure, the hot 
humid climate and low levels of farmer literacy, have 
also contributed to quality assurance problems 
Availability 1. timeliness 
2. availability at location convenient to farmer 
3. supply of crops/varieties farmers want - concentrating 
on those which informal channels cannot service 
Pricing 1. farmer willingness to buy seed depends partly on 
multiplication factor and market value of crop 
2. farmers less willing to buy seed which is costly (low 
multiplication factor) unless crop has high market value 
3. low yields compound reluctance to use purchased inputs 
Packaging I. required unit size (ie in small units) 
2. provides adequate protection/quality assurance 
3. provides information 
Adapted from: Muhhuku, 1999. 
Providing small-holders with seed at a price they can afford is not likely to problem-
:free for any organisation in Uganda. Climatic variability, poor infrastructure and 
security problems all play a role in this. However, the USP experience does provide 
some lessons and some of these can be addressed with appropriate investment and 
systems, irrespective of the exogenous constraints on supply. 
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Informal seed systems 
Farmer sources of seed can be divided into 4 categories: own seed; neighbours; local 
market; and commercial seed. The informal system comprises the first three. In 
Africa, farmers are often said to be dependent on informal sources for 90% of their 
seed needs. Table 2 illustrates this with data from the Machakos area in Kenya. 
Table 2: Seed sources as a percentage of total seed use in Machakos area, Kenya 
(short rains, 1983) 
Own seed Commercial seed Neighbours Local market 
Maize 83% 12% 1% 4% 
Sorghum 77% 8% 8% 5% 
Beans 89% 2% 2% 7% 
Cowpeas 80% 2% 8% 10% 
Pigeon peas 81% 1% 2% 15% 
Source: Muhammed et al., 1985, and de Bruijn et al., 1994, cited in Longley and 
Richards, 1998. 
Informal seed systems are likely to remain important. Even in developed countries, a 
significant proportion of seed planted has been retained from the previous harvest. 
Once farmers have first acquired improved open-pollinated varieties, they may 
subsequently use saved seed or informally traded seed. Vegetatively propagated 
planting material, such as cassava, is almost entirely dependent on informal sources -
a point that became abundantly clear when cassava mosaic disease in Uganda 
suddenly created a need for large quantities of clean planting material which could not 
be met initially by local sources. 
In addition, agricultural systems in Africa are subject to rapid change as a result of 
market liberalisation (and changes in prices that affect choice of technology and crop) 
and pressure to intensify. This means that informal seed systems, notwithstanding 
their present effectiveness, will have to adapt and change to meet different needs. 
This may have implications, for instance, for varietal selection and storability. NRI's 
work in Kenya, Malawi and Ghana has indicated strong demand for improved 
varieties - and anecdotal evidence from Uganda echoes this, at least for open-
pollinated varieties. 
Box 3 explores three aspects of informal seed systems: their attributes (both positive 
and negative); ways in which they can be strengthened; and intended outcomes. This 
is analogous to current thinking in rural finance - where there is a perceived 
opportunity to build on the strengths of informal systems (notably in outreach), with 
some of the knowledge or technology used by the formal system. There is very little 
experience in either area, and a need to pilot and review such models. 
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Box 3: exploitin2 the potential of informal seed systems 
Attributes of informal seed systems 
1. May be considered better value for seed which is: 
- bulky and therefore incurs high transport costs ( eg grains and legumes) 
- openly traded ( eg grain) such that farmers know the price ( eg grain) 
- easily stored 
- self-pollinated (and hence subject to slow genetic deterioration) 
2. May be the only source of crops and varieties needed in small quantities to meet 
local preferences, or suited to local, temporary, or evolving conditions; local 
varietal selection tends to yield seed which performs well locally 
3. Likely to be more accessible in rural areas 
4. Informal sources can supply seed on a timely basis (or not at all) 
5. Informal systems are more robust in the face of major disruption (such as civil 
war) but more vulnerable to local climatic risk than formal systems sourcing seed 
more widely; aid agencies buy seed in Uganda for relief programmes in 
neighbouring countries, and these "lumpy" purchases lead to extreme volatility in 
the prices and availability of formal sector seed 
6. Some crops which are almost entirely dependent on informal seed systems (roots 
and tubers) are also those valued by farmers vulnerable to disaster (whether man-
made or natural) because they can be kept in the ground until needed 
7. Informally sourced seed cannot be certified, but it can be "truthfully labelled" 
8. The quality of farmer-saved seed tends to be very good but subject to very 
variable storage management (work by NRI in Zambia and Ghana suggests that 
these practices are often "passed down" and probably not discussed that much 
within the community); seed management also tends to fall outside the extension 
system (extension officers often take leave after the harvest, and are pre-occupied 
with their own demonstration plots at planting time) 
Ways in which informal seed systems can be strengthened 
1. Providing them with access to NARS/IARC-bred foundation (/breeder) seed 
2. Extension advice on seed production, processing, treatment and storage 
3. Supporting a legal franiework that permits the marketing of uncertified, 
"truthfully labelled" seed which would conform to the prescribed standards 
regarding the genetic purity, germination and moisture content for that variety, 
except it would not carry an official certification tag 
Intended outcomes 
1. Greater availability, accessibility and affordability of seed which has locally 
preferred characteristics 
2. Improved quality and reliability of informally-sourced seed 
3. Greater integration of modem varieties into traditional seed systems 
4. Identification and wider dissemination of local varieties whose characteristics 
make them suitable for wider cultivation. 
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Strengthening commercial input distribution systems in Uganda 
The Ugandan Government's Agribusiness Development Centre (ADC), with support 
from USAID, has done considerable work on the intensification of maize and bean 
production. This focuses on the use of improved seed, fertiliser and crop 
management, sometimes with small quantities of chemicals·, to increase yields and 
reduce costs of production. ADC works with the extension services and NGOs to 
expose farmers to these technologies - using small demonstration plots (to compare 
traditional and improved systems), field days and farmer site supervision to reach 
approximately 120,000 farmers per annum. Rather than using credit, farmers have 
been encouraged to draw on their own resources, and to make these investments a 
high priority. ADC stresses the business management aspects of farming. 
Rural areas are poorly served by farm input networks and farmers usually lack 
information on purchased inputs. An additional focus for ADC has therefore been to 
try to bring inputs physically within reach of farmers, by providing support to the 
input supply chain: wholesaler importers, district distributors and village stockists. 
The support provided under ATAIN (Agent Training and Input Network) comprises: 
• mediation between the parties concerned 
• a loan guarantee (on which there has so far been no call) 
• training (product knowledge, safe use and handling, marketing, record-
keeping and business management). 
AT AIN facilitates trade between five regional distributors and village stockists, by 
guaranteeing small loans (made in the form of inputs advanced) to the stockists by the 
distributors. There has been no call on this guarantee so far, and stockists are not 
aware that the guarantee exists. There are roughly 180 stockists participating in the 
scheme - and all have benefited from the guarantee. 
The stockists also provide critical extension on the products - and the product training 
provided to the stockists has proved to be one of the most popular components of the 
project. Just as stockists are able to be extensionists, some government extension 
agents have become stockists as well. If these distribution systems can be sustained, 
the challenge will be to maintain objectivity in the advice provided by stockists. 
Should stockists choose to advance inputs to their customers, without first receiving 
full payment, ATAIN has no role in this transaction. (Certainly such arrangements 
occur - and village-level stockists are well-placed to assess the credit risk before 
entering into such informal agreements). An estimated 30-40,000 farmers have 
benefited from improved access to inputs. Despite these achievements, and the fact 
that ATAIN is operational in one of the most agriculturally progressive parts of 
Uganda (Mbale and Kapchorwa), small-holder demand for inputs is still very low 
(around 500 tonnes of fertiliser/season). 
ADC is also working on output marketing to enhance farmer confidence that his or 
her harvest will be sold at a fair price. This pilot scheme illustrates the potential to 
improve access to inputs and underlines the importance of co-ordinated action on 
technology transfer, input supply and output marketing. 
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Public/private partnerships in farm inputs and extension in Zimbabwe 
With growing emphasis on the communal sector in Zimbabwe, input companies are 
turning their attention to this potentially large market. Box 4 describes a number of 
pilot initiatives experimenting with ways to increase communal farmer access to 
purchased inputs. Each of these has different characteristics but all use partnership 
approaches and incorporate extension. (Although one of these also uses credit, it is 
included here to illustrate the potential when different players collaborate). 
Box 4: Pilotint? public/private partnerships in extension and inputs in Zimbabwe 
• input supplier links with the Grain Marketing Board, Zimbabwe 
Farmers Union and transport brokers to reduce transport costs and 
exploit warehouse storage available in rural areas 
• input supplier links with cotton marketing companies to sell inputs at 
the point of cotton sale (orders are taken, paid for, and farm delivery 
subsequently made by the input company) 
• input company linkages with other input companies, government 
extension services and farmers groups, with extension costs met partly 
by the input companies3, without strings attached 
• input companies working with NGOs and local retailers to support the 
development of local retailer networks (by providing training and loan 
guarantees) 
• collaboration between cotton companies, banks and input supply 
companies, to transfer farmers who reliably repay input loans from 
company schemes to bank schemes, with the banks aiming to 
strengthen their rural outreach and savings mobilisation. 
Alternative approaches to input constraints: how they compare 
Box 5 summarises how each of these schemes affects the key constraints identified in 
the previous section. The schemes' impacts are fairly evenly spread across the five 
constraints (affordability, availability, information, risk and uncertainty, and 
commercial context)- and virtually all schemes perform well in at least four of the 
five areas. Most of the schemes help reduce risk by providing farmers with better 
information (on the appropriate input to use, and recommended methods of 
application) or by an explicit link to crop marketing. The table could be used as a 
check-list to identify areas for improvement in poorly performing schemes. The 
Malawi scheme, for instance, would be improved by better extension on the inputs 
distributed, and recommended practices. 
3 For instance, Novartis has been working with a number of local companies and supplying Agritex 
staff with motorbikes, which they subsequently are able to buy, with payment by instalments. 
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Box 5: How different input schemes affect kev constraints to farmer use of pruchased inputs 
Affordability Availability Information Risk and Commercial 
Scheme uncertainty context 
Uganda More Improved- Infonnation Risk reduced Little or 
credit affordable - but timeliness on input and decision negative effect 
factored into still a problem package taken out of 
crop price farmers' hands 
Zimbabwe Improved- Little direct Package Links to crop Reinforces 
credit via credit effect includes marketing commercial 
extension reduce risk approach 
Outgrower Improved- Improved Package Risk reduced Participation 
schemes input credit access to includes and decisions in export 
integral to marketing extension taken out of development -
package system and farmers' hands though 
required approach is 
inputs rather 
paternalistic 
Centenary Improved - by No direct Some Reduced a Farmer 
Bank credit effect additional little through encouraged to 
extension extension and be "business-
advice planning like" 
advice 
Starter packs Improved- Improved- Some Free inputs Little or 
inputs are free otherwise hard extension- shield farmer negative effect 
to obtain but inadequate from some 
consequences 
of risk and 
uncertainty 
Input sales Improved by Inputs made Little direct Little direct Farmer 
when crops timing of sales available at effect effect encouraged to 
sold location suited be "business-
to farmer like" 
Farmers' Improved by Timing, Little direct Risk reduced Farmer can 
seed needs in small unit size location and effect if seed is of more easily 
Uganda seed type all reliable develop farm 
important quality business 
Informal seed Affordable Improved Reinforces Risk reduced - Farmer can 
systems local sources infonnal locally more easily 
sources suitable develop farm 
business 
Building Little direct Vastly Retailers give Infonnation Farmers can 
commercial effect improved product and and crop more easily 
input systems safe use marketing plan/develop 
in Uganda infonnation component farm-and 
helps reduced commercial 
risk networks 
expand 
Partnerships Some effect Improved Improved Information Helps develop 
in Zimbabwe on costs via services- through helps reduce rural economy 
more efficient including collaboration risk and services 
use of delivery of on extension 
transport inputs to farm 
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PRIORITIES FOR POLICY AND DIRECT INTERVENTION 
Getting the private sector involved in small-holder input credit 
Developing viable smallholder input credit schemes 
Credit is often considered the major issue in increasing farmer access to purchased 
inputs. Yet smallholders are almost invariably very poorly served by the formal 
financial sector on account of high transaction costs associated with small loans, a 
dispersed rural clientele, and a poor information on crops and marketing. In some 
situations, however, the private sector (notably processors or traders) may be willing 
to extend input credit to smallholders in order to overcome a supply constraint. Box 
6 summarises the factors that influence the viability of such input credit schemes. 
Box 6: Factors which affect viability of commercial crop input credit schemes 
Factors/aspect Effect 
Crop market characteristics 
I. Crop purchase monopoly and little food/farm use of crop + 
2. Possible for all buyers/users to form association and little food/farm + 
use 
3. Multiple marketing channels and/or food use 
-
Input qualities 
I. Inputs provided in-kind + 
2. Limited alternative use or market for input + 
3. Returns to input use are greatest for the crop in question + 
CommerciaVcredit context 
I. Farmers treat farm as a business and are integrated into markets + 
2. History of loan amnesties, default without penalty, subsidised inputs -
* 
* 
* 
* 
3. Supportive legal/political/contract enforcement institutions + * 
Modus operandi of scheme 
I. Group schemes for peer pressure + 
2. Group or individual schemes backed up by monitoring/good + 
information, support staff, and ability to act 
3. Incentives for repayment and penalties for non-repayment + 
4. Appropriate incentives for field monitors/co-ordinators + 
5. Training provided to farmers - extension and business management + 
6. Developing relationship/trust/loyalty through field presence/contact + 
7. Accessibility of scheme - minimise red tape and transaction costs; + 
organise so location and timing of contact is convenient to farmers 
8. Effective and timely monitoring of input use and crop marketing + 
Note: *denotes killer assumption 
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The significance of these categories, and particular aspects, is that they need not all be 
present for a scheme to work, but most schemes will need to incorporate several 
aspects to ensure a degree of success. For instance, the Ugandan cotton example 
relied on the buyers forming an association (crop market characteristic 2), but for the 
scheme to succeed it was also necessary for inputs to be provided in-kind, and to 
incorporate several measures from the modus operandi group ( eg., monitoring, 
extension and accessibility). The scheme can then function, even if the overall 
commercial context is weak. 
The Zimbabwean cotton credit example indicates that even when few favourable crop 
market and input conditions are present (fertiliser and cash(!) are available on credit 
in Zimbabwe), it is nonetheless possible to develop strong and viable input schemes. 
The success of the schemes in Zimbabwe is very dependent on the presence of 
favourable conditions relating to overall commercial context, and modus operandi. 
So-called "killer assumptions" are also identified in Box 6, ie. conditions which 
would be favourable (for the operation of a credit scheme) if in place - but rarely are 
so. They include: crop purchase monopolies, which are increasingly rare; situations 
where all buyers can form an association effectively creating a crop purchase 
monopoly; inputs that have no other use or cannot be put to any other comparably 
profitable use; and supportive institutions for contract enforcement (the importance of 
which is particularly stressed by Dorward et al., 1998). The latter is included 
because although many countries may have appropriate legislation or policy, there are 
often compelling political economy, implementation and access factors that prevent 
its effective operation at local-level, or for particular groups. Also, the buyers' 
association approach (similar to the Uganda cotton example described earlier) may be 
difficult to apply in practice, because of unwillingness to take joint action. The fact 
that these favourable conditions rarely apply means that a viable scheme is necessarily 
dependent on several measures which could be described as best practice in lending to 
small-scale farmers. 
Best practice in rural credit, in company input schemes and other loan programmes 
Box 6 lists a number of carrot and stick measures (under modus operandi) - which do 
not depend on unrealistic assumptions about, for instance, the ability to enforce 
contracts using legal mechanisms (which even if possible, would probably be very 
transaction costs-intensive). Their focus on groups, training, monitoring and 
incentive systems makes them initially costly - but once in place, farmers can take on 
a greater share of these costs (groups can act as crop assembly points, and distribution 
points for inputs - reducing the transaction costs inherent in reaching many small 
farmers). Moreover, these measures build group/individual capacity so that farmers 
are able to combine their knowledge of, for instance, land characteristics and 
agronomy, with information about inputs, and use this to make informed decisions 
about input use. Without this capacity building, technology packages tend to be 
inflexible (and therefore not ideal in all situations) or very costly in terms of extension 
(as seen, for instance, with some of the intensively-managed small-holder outgrower 
export horticulture schemes in Africa). Nonetheless, the implicit start-up costs, and 
the fact that the benefits are long-term (and also, far wider than just the crop in 
question) mean that they are only likely to be attractive to companies able to take a 
longer view. 
28 
Such best practice mechanisms in rural lending are robust to different situations. For 
instance, they are similar to the measures used by Grameen Bank type schemes -
where inputs are not necessarily provided in-kind or targeted to a particular crop. 
This approach, moreover, yields benefits even where the marketing structure does not 
demand such an approach. (The cotton company in Mali, for instance, which has a 
crop purchase monopoly, nonetheless uses virtually all of these measures to reduce 
transaction costs and increase cotton output). There seems to be a clear lesson here 
for Uganda too: whilst it is difficult to envisage a preferable viable alternative to the 
existing scheme given current conditions and circumstances (and this is true, despite 
all the problems in the operation of the input scheme), it does not obviate the 
necessity and desirability of investment in longer term measures aimed at more 
sustainable and substantive improvements in small-holder productivity. At the same 
time, it may be more difficult still to get commitment to such long-term goals 
amongst a large group of companies (approximately 30), including many that have 
only participated reluctantly in the scheme. 
Non-credit mechanisms that make inputs more affordable 
Subsidy is not the only option 
In the absence of credit, there are nevertheless a number of other ways in which inputs 
can be made more affordable for small-holders. In Malawi, inputs were distributed 
free of charge to farmers - but this must be regarded as an exceptional response to an 
evolving crisis. There are many other ways to improve affordability, without reliance 
on a public subsidy. 
Making inputs available in the small quantities farmers want 
In Uganda, seeds could be made available in packet sizes more closely suited to 
farmer needs. Had appropriate packing plant been installed from the outset, this 
would have added little to per unit costs of seed. 
Selling inputs when farmers have the cash to buy them 
In Zimbabwe, input and cotton companies have collaborated to sell next season cotton 
inputs when farmers sell their cotton harvest. This arrangement is beneficial to all 
concerned - without locking the farmer into a credit agreement that s/he may find 
difficult to honour, and the cotton company may find costly to monitor/enforce. From 
the cotton company's perspective, it is a relatively low-cost way to promote increased 
cotton production, whilst the input company can make extra sales with relatively low 
transaction costs. (Inputs are delivered to the farmer subsequently - so transport costs 
are incurred by the input company - but savings are made in rural retail and storage 
costs). 
Reducing input marketing and distribution costs 
In Zimbabwe there has been collaboration between the cotton companies, the input 
companies, transport companies and the banking sector, to reduce the cost of farm 
inputs and services. Information has been shared to enable transport costs to be 
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reduced by the co-ordination on input and output marketing. The banking sector has 
been able to "adopt" reliable agricultural borrowers (with the banks benefiting in the 
medium-term from access to rural savings), enabling the cotton companies to achieve 
greater coverage with their own loan programmes. 
Addressing other factors that constrain smallholder access to purchased inputs 
All the interventions described in the previous section addressed some of the other 
four issues identified: availability, information, risk and uncertainty, and commercial 
context. One scheme addressed these whilst not addressing affordability at all. 
Availability 
Improved availability of inputs is emphasised by most of the schemes reviewed. 
There is good reason for this, and much evidence to suggest that it is a more important 
constraint than affordability. IFDC (1990), cited by Larson and Frisvold (1996), 
reports that on average, farmers in sub-Saharan Africa must travel 18 miles to the 
nearest fertiliser supply point. Larson and Frisvold's conclusions (ibid, p522) 
emphasise the availability constraint: 
"Several studies document that the simple physical availability of fertiliser to 
farmers, in appropriate quantity packages and at the appropriate time of the 
year, remains a constraint to increasing fertiliser use in sub-Saharan Africa." 
Several authors (including Shepherd, 1989 and Larson and Frisvold, op.cit) point to 
the inevitable role of the private sector in improving input availability. In promoting 
this role, it is important that consideration be given to the fact that private rural 
suppliers choose between different products (for example, tinned food, soap powder, 
and farm inputs). The ATAIN programme in Uganda, which focuses explicitly on the 
development of commercial input networks, does not emphasise the need to improve 
returns to fertiliser marketing relative to those obtained from other products retailed in 
rural areas. Rather, ATAIN demonstrates that inputs can be retailed profitably- but 
the way in which it links this, responsibly, to training in safe and appropriate use of 
inputs, almost certainly adds significantly to retailing costs relative to those incurred 
on other products. 
Interestingly, the private initiatives in Zimbabwe implicitly take account of this, by 
using retail points where synergies with other activities (and hence economies of 
scope) can be exploited (sharing transport costs, and marketing inputs alongside 
output purchases). 
Information 
The need for better farmer information on inputs and yield response is widely 
stressed, and is reflected in the extension component included in some of the input 
schemes reviewed. The importance of extension in improving the performance of 
input credit schemes is also widely recognised. Improved information helps reduce 
the risk and uncertainty to which the farmer is exposed when adopting new 
technology. 
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The information constraint is partly an information.flow constraint, but there are also 
some fundamental gaps in knowledge on the technical and economic effects of 
improved use of purchased inputs and other crop management strategies. Although 
some of the necessary research has been conducted (even if the results are not 
available, nor the conclusions updated to reflect current prices), much has not - even 
in countries which have accorded a relatively high priority to agricultural research 
(such as Zimbabwe). As the pressure to intensify and develop packages which 
African farmers can and will adopt increases, the need for research and dissemination 
on farmer-adapted input and crop management strategies becomes more critical. 
For example: 
"No work has been done to revise, in view of changing soil, variety, and 
economic conditions, the recommendations developed during the early 
1960s ... 
While introducing fertiliser as an essential input to achieve yield increases is 
important, it is equally important that the correct message on nutrient 
requirements by crop and by area is delivered. The information presently 
available in Uganda on fertiliser nutrient requirements for Uganda's crops and 
soils is inadequate". (IFDC, 1999, ppll-12). 
There is a key role here for public-funded research. The private sector is unlikely to 
do this research - because it would be difficult to recoup such costs through product 
sales. (Smallholders have limited purchasing power, and the most useful research is 
likely to focus on synergies between farmer-supplied and purchased inputs). In many 
countries, a useful starting point would be to collate and review existing information 
before identifying priorities for revision, updating, and new research. 
Risk and uncertainty 
In the second section, four categories of risk and uncertainty were identified: weather 
risk, market risk, uncertainty over input choice and quality, and uncertainty over 
export market acceptance of produce treated with chemicals. 
The schemes reviewed in the previous section relied principally on two mechanisms 
to reduce risk and uncertainty: the provision of extension advice, to improve farmer 
knowledge on the correct choice and use of purchased inputs; and links with output 
markets, such that the farmer would be confident of selling his/her produce. 
Implicitly, most of the programmes assured "fair" retail prices for inputs, and some 
were able to offer lower prices on account of bulk purchase orders ( eg cotton inputs in 
Zimbabwe). AT AIN argues that it tackles market risk (ie uncertainty over output 
price) by improving the overall profitability of the farm enterprise, such that a fall in 
output price is less critical. 
Although farming is to some extent an inherently risky activity, there are some other 
ways in which risk can be reduced. There is always a degree of weather risk - but in 
Uganda, the UGEA was negotiating commercial crop insurance to cover the loan 
taken out for cotton farmer inputs, in the event that natural disaster should lead to a 
significant reduction in the expected cotton harvest. From the farmer's perspective, 
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there may be little thats/he can do to reduce this risk, except by diversifying, and 
cultivating some known drought-tolerant varieties. New varieties will carry a higher 
perceived risk, and the risk of crop failure in the event of poor weather conditions 
may indeed by higher. Moreover, the stakes will be higher still if other purchased 
inputs have been used. 
For some crops, unpredictable output prices are the major risk. Interventions which 
lead to better market integration (ie smoother flows of produce between swplus and 
deficit areas) will help reduce (but not eliminate) this source of risk. 1bis might 
include improvements in infrastructure (roads, telecommunications), financial 
services (such that traders can more easily finance their operations), deregulation of 
rural transport and trading to increase competition, and better information on farmer 
production and market prices. In some countries, where large unpredictable 
purchases of food crops for relief programmes in neighbouring countries contribute to 
price volatility, it may be possible for the government to negotiate with the donors to 
obtain advance notification, and to smooth such purchases (over time and crops) 
where possible. 
Improved information on inputs (including information on input quality assessment 
criteria) will help reduce the risk perceived by farmers in using purchased inputs. The 
government can also play an important role in setting and enforcing appropriate 
product standards - for instance, in seed quality. Where the government is itself 
involved in the supply of seed or inputs, it should ensure that these meet the highest 
standards. (A failing of the Malawi scheme was the poor germination rate of the 
groundnut seed distributed). Farmers often face uncertain prices for inputs too. In 
Zimbabwe, input company representatives at the NRI workshop proposed that input 
prices in rural areas should be monitored, because they feared that unnecessarily high 
retail prices were undermining the scope to develop the smallholder market. 
Commercial context 
In the second section it was noted that the overall commercial context affects the 
production and marketing strategies adopted by farmers. This not only affects output 
marketing options, it influences the availability of retailers/traders willing to supply 
farm inputs. Transaction costs are reduced as commercial activity increases, and as 
the rural economy develops, more services become available and affordable in rural 
areas. Government policies on market reform and competition (for instance in 
transport and banking), and infrastructure development, influence these trends -
though on their own they may be insufficient to fuel economic development in 
particular areas. At the micro-level, extension programmes might reinforce these 
tendencies, by stressing farm budgets and marketing, but trends in the rural economy 
are likely to have a greater bearing on farmer activities. 
Governments and donors, however, need to consider carefully how their actions and 
programmes affect the development of sustainable commercial services in rural areas. 
In Uganda, private companies argue that the establishment of viable rural farm input 
networks is undermined by subsidised input programmes in Uganda and neighbouring 
countries. Such programmes, which are normally donor-funded, are popular with 
farmers and politicians alike. They are often undertaken as an emergency response -
making it still more difficult to build an effective consensus around the need to 
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minimise this type of action. The input companies, moreover, agree to supply them-
thus undermining their own position (though in the absence of co-ordinated action, if 
they did not do this they would simply see lucrative contracts go to their competitors, 
without any progress towards the development of commercial networks). Yet, the 
emphasis accorded to this problem in Uganda suggests that there is a need to review 
the impact of such actions and develop alternative strategies that off er greater 
prospects for the development of sustainable supply networks in the medium-term. 
Policies to promote smallholder access to purchased inputs in Africa 
Building on the conclusions above, policies to promote better access to purchased 
inputs can be divided into two groups: 
• agricultural sector policies 
• policies to promote general market development and competition 
Agricultural sector policies 
1. A void agricultural input interventions that undermine the development of 
sustainable commercial input distribution networks or contribute to poor financial 
discipline (such as subsidised input schemes and loan amnesties). In dialogue 
with donors, NGOs and private companies, governments should seek to develop 
alternative strategies to deal with emergency needs which assure longer term 
development goals too. 
2. Support the development of the farm input sector with appropriate standards and 
regulation, information and training. Identify appropriate channels for 
dissemination, exploiting opportunities in the commercial and voluntary sectors, 
as well as with extension services and farmer groups or CBOs. 
3. Promote public/private/NGO/farmer partnerships that improve farmer access to 
purchased inputs. Identify appropriate roles for government agents ( eg in 
extension partnerships, or the pivotal co-ordinating role played by CDO in 
Uganda). Build farmer group capacity, as a vehicle for extension, input 
distribution, crop assembly, and participation in wider consultative processes. 
4. Fill research and information gaps on the use of purchased inputs, including 
combination packages which exploit synergies between farmer-supplied and 
external inputs. 
Policies to promote general market development and competition 
1. Undertake market reforms and liberalisation where still necessary, relating to 
agricultural marketing (inputs and outputs), financial services, and transport - to 
improve the availability of and competition in rural services. 
2. Ensure that the appropriate legislative frameworks and contract enforcement 
mechanisms exist, and that these are accessible to the groups for which they are 
intended. 
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3. Develop rural infrastructure - particularly relating to roads, telecommunications 
and electrification. 
Although these last three policy areas are not specific to input markets, they 
contribute to the overall context in which the farming sector develops. The four areas 
identified under agricultural policy, however, provide some clear pointers on 
government actions to promote access to farm inputs, whilst the earlier analysis 
provides guidelines on the nature and design of direct interventions likely to succeed. 
Without exception, the latter depend on constructive dialogue and collaboration 
between public and private agents. 
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Improving smallholder access to purchased inputs in sub-Saharan Africa1 
by Ann Gordon 
Why smallholder access to purchased inputs in Africa is important 
Smallholder agriculture in much of sub-Saharan Africa is essentially low-input low-
output. Since 1970, cereal yields in Africa have stagnated, whilst they have trebled 
in Asia, and risen by 2.5 times in Latin America. Green revolution technology has 
not been widely adopted. For instance, for all developing countries, the shares of 
cropped area devoted to modem varieties are 57% (maize), 70% (wheat), and 74% 
(rice). Of these three, maize is the crop most relevant to Africa-and only 43% of 
maize area in sub-Saharan Africa is devoted to modem varieties of maize. (Fritschel 
et al., 1996). Moreover, many crops which are important in Africa (roots and tubers, 
cooking bananas, sorghum and millet) are not as important elsewhere, and have 
therefore received less research. Fertiliser use is also very low. Average use is only 
I Okg/ha (Larson and Frisvold, 1996). Indian rainfed agriculture has three times the 
fertiliser applied to African crops. Such aggregate data, moreover, conceal extreme 
variability in application: five countries account for roughly 2/3 of fertiliser 
consumption in sub-Saharan Africa. (African Development Bank, 1996). 
Increased use of inputs in African agriculture is an important policy issue because: 
• most of Africa's population lives in rural areas, and is dependent on 
agriculture for at least part of its income 
• in the past, increases in productivity were achieved through expansion 
of planted area, but as population pressure increases there is markedly 
less scope to do this 
• few African countries have been able to keep pace with the food needs 
of growing populations, and food imports are rising steeply 
• much of Africa's agricultural production is located in vulnerable low 
potential areas, and even higher potential lands are now showing signs 
of environmental degradation 
• changes in agricultural markets following structural adjustment have 
left many farmers with poorer access to purchased inputs. 
The focus ofthis paper is purchased inputs - especially improved seed and fertiliser. 
This is not intended to imply any exclusivity in this strategy to increase productivity -
rather that purchased inputs, even in small quantities, can usefully complement other 
means of intensification. Moreover, the issues affecting access to purchased inputs 
are somewhat different to those that apply to farmer-supplied inputs. In addition, 
agricultural markets in Africa, which influence the production strategies adopted by 
fanners, have been subject to considerable recent change - making re-analysis of 
these issues an urgent priority. 
1 This publication is an output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed here 
are not necessarily those ofDFID. (R7197 Crop Post-Harvest Research Programme). 
Factors which affect input access 
Box 1 summarises some of the factors that influence smallholder access to purchased 
inputs. 
Box 1: Factors that influence smallholder access to purchased inputs 
Affordability 1. price - input is too dear 
2. transaction costs - supply cost to rural areas and farmer costs in 
sourcing inputs influence affordability 
3. unit size - small pack sizes more appropriate and affordable 
4. credit - can improve affordability 
5. timing of purchase - farmers can afford inputs better if they are 
sold when the farmer has income from crop sales 
6. who makes the purchase within the household - input decision 
may depend on access to household cash resources 
Availability 1. low purchasing power results in small domestic markets and 
limit the availability of farm inputs 
2. even if, eg, fertiliser is available, specific formulae may not be 
3. products may not be available when needed 
4. even when available in the capital, weak or absent rutal 
distribution networks constrain farmer access to inputs 
Information 1. basic information on yield response not always there 
2. extension services stretched 
3. other sources of information limited and unreliable 
4. farmers need reliable information on prices 
5. information on safe use of chemicals also important 
6. information on how to assess input quality important 
Risk and 1. weather risk 
Uncertainty 2. market risk 
3. risk that input is unsuitable or of poor quality 
4. risk that export markets r~ject chemically treated crops 
Commercial 1. farmers' expectations of markets and prices 
context 2. financial discipline and availability of credit 
3. critical mass in rural services affects transaction costs 
4. rural traders offering inputs and information 
5. farmers market-oriented and treat farming as business 
Smallholder input credit programmes 
Credit is one way to make inputs more affordable to smallholders. Yet African 
farmers are extremely poorly served by formal financial institutions. Lending to 
farmers is considered high cost and risky. The size of individual loans is small, and 
banks have poor information about farming operations and their potential rural clients. 
Nor can the informal sector meet this need, because there are insufficient funds to 
cover the seasonal demand for input loans, when everyone's need arises at the same 
time. 
Cotton grown in tropical zones is normally vulnerable to pest attack, so cotton crops 
tend to be heavy users of relatively expensive pesticides. NRI recently reviewed 
cotton input schemes with extremely large coverage - far in excess of numbers served 
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by conventional financial institutions. Two of the schemes reviewed in Zimbabwe 
have combined participation of around 60,000 communal farmers - and the tools they 
use to facilitate and coerce repayment of input loans are almost state-of-the-art best 
practice (see Box 2), yielding repayment rates of 98%+. 
Box 2: Best practice in cotton company lending to smallholders in Zimbabwe 
1. Group schemes for peer pressure 
2. Group or individual schemes backed up by monitoring/good information, support 
staff, and ability to act 
3. Incentives for repayment and penalties for non-repayment 
4. Appropriate incentives for field monitors/co-ordinators 
5. Training provided to farmers- extension and business management 
6. Developing relationship/trust/loyalty through field presence/contact 
7. Accessibility of scheme- minimise red tape and transaction costs; organise so 
location and timing of contact is convenient to farmers 
8. Effective and timely monitoring of input use and crop marketing 
In Uganda, a completely different approach involves the 30 or so ginners forming an 
association, and jointly taking responsibility for an input loan. Seed and chemicals 
are then distributed "free" to some 300,000 farmers. Ginners make a uniform 
deduction in prices paid to farmers for their seed cotton, to cover the cost of the 
inputs, but they still use price to compete amongst themselves for the farmers' crop. 
Ginners' contributions to loan repayment are then calculated on the basis of volumes 
ginned by the individual companies. The scheme certainly has its problems, not least 
assuring that the inputs are used on cotton, and are available when needed. Moreover, 
a less paternalistic scheme in which farmers make their own production technology 
decisions would no doubt be more efficient - were it possible at the present time. 
However, it an imaginative way to boost production rapidly. The ginneries were 
recently privatised but when individual companies set up their own loan schemes they 
made massive losses because farmers took out loans but avoided repayment by selling 
their crop to other ginning companies. Recent experience of loan amnesties and 
subsidised inputs made it administratively and politically impossible for the 
companies to enforce the contracts drawn up with participating farmers. 
Both types of scheme are interesting because they are undoubtedly commercially-
driven. In Zimbabwe, the cotton companies only lend to farmers who achieve a 
certain level of production. Their objective is to boost production, and to achieve as 
much increase in output as possible with their resources. So the scheme focuses on 
the more able and reliable farmers. In Uganda, however, the scheme is very poverty-
focused. Cotton is now a low-risk crop, but it is only marginally profitable - and 
many farmers only grow it because of the benefits to following crops, and the timing 
of sales, which coincides with Christmas and new school year expenditures. Better-
resourced farmers, more willing or able to bear some risk, do not grow cotton. 
But credit is not the only way to make inputs more affordable 
There are alternatives to credit, however. Cotton companies in Zimbabwe sell cotton 
inputs for the next season crop when farmers sell this year's crop. Farmers have the 
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cash - and the transaction is all the easier, because cotton companies arrange for the 
input suppliers to make farmgate deliveries. They have also tried to reduce the cost of 
supplying inputs to rural areas, by making cost reductions in distribution and 
marketing ( eg through bulk purchases, transport sharing arrangements, and farmers' 
groups taking on more responsibilities). 
Input availability is a key constraint 
Although agriculture is the most important sector in most African countries, low 
purchasing power by farmers means that the markets for inputs are still relatively 
small. Moreover, these markets are dispersed and often in areas poorly served by 
roads and telecommunications. Thin or absent rural input distribution networks are 
the consequence - meaning that even those farmers who can afford inputs may not 
find them available locally. Several development agencies are now experimenting 
with innovative programmes aimed at promoting the development of commercial 
input distribution networks, but a critical constraint remains the profitability of selling 
farm inputs vis a vis other rural retail goods, that can be marketed all year round, and 
do not depend on credit. Zimbabwean attempts to reduce input distribution costs 
give implicit consideration to this, at least, because they do not depend on the 
involvement of normal rural retail outlets. 
Information 
Increasing smallholder use of purchased inputs also requires improved information. 
In some countries, critical information on yield response to inputs, on certain crops, 
grown on different soil types, is simply not available. Elsewhere, the information 
exists but does not reach farmers - because extension services are over-stretched, and 
there are few alternative means by which farmers can obtain such information. 
Farmers need different sorts of information. They need information on the best input 
to use - but they also need to know how to apply, how to do so safely and what it will 
cost. Quality assessment is also critical. Where possible, farmers need to know how 
to assess the quality of inputs without waiting to see how they perform in practice. 
Seed quality can be particularly problematic - even if guarantees of refunds or 
replacement are made in the event of non-germination. By the time seed has to be 
sown a second time, the farmer has already used extra labour (when demands on 
his/her time are onerous) and the ideal planting date has passed, so there is an 
opportunity cost in terms of crop income, from this or an alternative crop. 
Risk and uncertainty 
Farming is inherently risky- because of weather and market factors. Schemes aimed 
increasing smallholder use of purchased inputs should try to reduce uncertainty, by 
giving farmers as much information as possible on the appropriate choice and 
application of inputs. Many schemes that involve the supply of specific inputs 
effectively reduce market risk faced by the farmer, by providing a market for the end-
product (as with the cotton input schemes, or the horticultural outgrower schemes). 
Commercial context 
The overall commercial context affects farmers' willingness to use inputs and to take 
out and repay loans. Farmers who are reasonably confident about being able to sell a 
product at remunerative prices are obviously more likely to use inputs than if they 
were concerned they might cover their costs. In Uganda, where farmers retreated to a 
largely subsistence economy during years of civil war, and many areas are still very 
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poorly served by commercial traders, markedly more progressive agricultural 
practices are evident in the some of the areas bordering Kenya. In these areas, trading 
activities have continued unabated for much longer, with Kenya providing inputs and 
an output market even when markets in Uganda were completely disrupted. 
Attitudes towards credit can also vary markedly. In Uganda, many credit schemes 
have run into difficulties because of expectations of input subsidies and loan 
amnesties, and administrative and political difficulties in enforcing loan repayments. 
By contrast, supportive legal, political and cultural institutions in Zimbabwe, partly 
explain the success of the cotton company input schemes there. 
Policies to improve smallholder access to purchased inputs in Africa 
In addition to policies aimed the general development of rural economies, a number of 
more specific policy recommendations are made: 
1. A void agricultural input interventions that undermine the development of 
sustainable commercial input distribution networks or contribute to poor financial 
discipline (such as subsidised input schemes and loan amnesties. 
2. Support the development of the farm input sector with appropriate standards and 
regulation, information and training. Identify appropriate channels for 
dissemination, exploiting opportunities in the commercial and voluntary sectors, 
as well as with extension services and farmer groups or CBOs. 
3. Promote public/private/NGO/farmer partnerships that improve farmer access to 
purchased inputs. Identify appropriate roles for government agents ( eg in 
extension partnerships, or the pivotal co-ordinating role played by Cotton 
Development Organisation in Uganda, which supported the ginners in their bid to 
associate, access funds and distribute inputs). Build farmer group capacity, as a 
vehicle for extension, input distribution, crop assembly, and participation in wider 
consultative processes. 
4. Fill research and information gaps on the use of purchased inputs, including 
combination packages which exploit synergies between farmer-supplied and 
external inputs. 
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Farmer credit schemes run by the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa 1 
Ann Gordon, Natural Resources Institute 
Economic liberalisation has left many farmers in Africa with worse access to 
purchased inputs. Governments no longer subsidise inputs, loss-making loan schemes 
have been closed, crop purchase monopolies (which made it easier to collect 
repayment from farmers) are largely a thing of the past, and widespread devaluation 
means that imported inputs now seem much dearer, when expressed in local 
currencies. 
Much hope was pinned on the emergence of a dynamic private sector in the wake of 
market reforms. In fact, commercial activity has been highly selective and often 
disappointing. Many farmers find their access to markets and services worse than it 
was before the reforms. Recent research by NRI highlights some encouraging and 
swprising developments, however. For instance, in Uganda and Zimbabwe private 
cotton companies are the most important source of formal sector credit in the 
smallholder sector. In Uganda, an estimated 300,000 farmers benefit, whilst around 
60,000 communal farmers participate in the Zimbabwean schemes. The schemes 
operate along entirely different lines - but both models point a way forward in 
otherwise difficult circumstances. 
First, Zimbabwe, where the schemes could aptly be described as state-of-the-art in 
lending to smallholders. Before liberalisation there was just one cotton parastatal. It 
operated a loan programme - and was easily able to collect on these loans when 
fanners sold their crop. After liberalisation, however, repayment rates fell, as farmers 
avoided repayment by selling their crop to one of the other two companies. Steps 
were taken to tighten up the scheme, and one of the other companies started its own 
scheme, operating along very similar lines. The companies now achieve repayment 
rates in excess of98%, using a variety of measures: 
• All borrowers belong to groups of cotton smallholders. Default by one member of 
the group brings retribution to the whole group, which may be subsequently 
excluded from the scheme. This increases incentives to repay. 
• Groups performing well receive cash rewards. 
• If defaulting occurs, the companies act swiftly and come down heavily on 
defaulters, seizing assets when necessary. 
• Local agents of the cotton companies are in year-round contact with smallholders, 
building closer relationships and a. sense of loyalty to the company. 
• Additional services are provided in addition to the input credit. Extension advice 
may be provided, and the Cotton Company has recently introduced cash loans. 
Again, these additional benefits of "belonging" to a company help to strengthen 
relationships and loyalty. 
1 This publication is an output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed here 
are not necessarily those ofDFID. R7197 Crop Post-Harvest Research Programme. 
The scheme is run along strict commercial lines. Farmers have to achieve a certain 
threshold yield before they may participate (so it effectively focuses on the more able 
fanners) - and the companies have resisted the temptation to expand the scheme to 
cover a larger group of less productive fanners. 
In Uganda, the scheme seems clwnsy and inefficient by comparison. The sector has 
recently been privatised - and farmers were initially reluctant to grow cotton, having 
bitter memories of the former voucher system, where low state-controlled payments 
were often late or not honoured at all. Some of the larger ginning companies tried to 
run schemes like the Zimbabwean model, but soon found that they were losing 
massive amounts, with fanners simply selling their crop to other ginners to avoid 
repayment of loans. Moreover, in Uganda it proved logistically and politically 
impossible to enforce loan/crop purchase contracts - and there was no support for 
ginners trying to seize fanners' assets in compensation for unpaid debts. 
So the ginners (there are about 30 in Uganda) jointly took out a loan to pay for inputs, 
which were then distributed "free" to farmers. Individual contributions to repayment 
of the loan are based on the volwne of cotton ginned by each ginnery. Farmers 
receive less for their cotton, to take account of the cost of inputs - but the ginners still 
compete on price for the farmers' crop. Farmers cannot avoid paying for the inputs -
because all the ginners participate in the scheme. There are lots of problems with the 
scheme - not least making sure that the farmers receive inputs free of charge, when 
needed, and that the inputs are used on the cotton crop. Also, the more efficient 
fanners are effectively penalised: they actually pay more for their inputs (because 
they sell more cotton) whilst the less efficient farmers pay less for their inputs. 
Clearly, in the long run it will be important to shift to more efficient sustainable input 
credit mechanisms - but in the short-run, as a pragmatic stop-gap measure to rapidly 
increase cotton output, it has much to commend it. 
Both schemes have much wider application. The Zimbabwean scheme could be 
applied to a variety of crops. It depends on strict application of a package of "best 
practice" measures and a supportive institutional framework for contract enforcement. 
The Ugandan scheme, notwithstanding its problems, still points a way forward where 
financial discipline amongst farmers and the conditions for contract enforcement are 
weak. However, the scope for buyers to form a fairly ''watertight" association may be 
limited to crops with fairly specific marketing options, such as certain export crops, or 
crops that need processing like fibres or oilseeds. Also, both models depend on 
private sector preparedness to provide credit - which is only likely to arise when they 
face some sort of supply constraint. 
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Ann Gordon 
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Credit provision for small-holder farmers: lessons from Uganda and Zimbabwe1 
by Andrew Goodland and Ann Gordon, Natural Resources Institute, June 1999 
Presented at a workshop on Agricultural Marketing Reform in southern Africa, 
organised by Oxford Policy Management, and funded by DFID, 2 July 1999. 
1 This publication is an output from a research project funded by the United .Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing cowitries. The views expressed here 
are not necessarily those ofDFID. R7197 Crop Post-harvest Research Programme. 
Introduction. 
The agricultural supply response to market liberalisation in Africa has been extremely 
variable, but often disappointing-particularly for food crops. For some crops and 
regions, it seems that policy-makers over-estimated commercial willingness to 
become involved in the marketing of small-holder production. Perceived risk, poor 
information and high transaction costs have contributed to an often weak commercial 
presence in the more marginal or remote areas. Yet the parastatals that formerly 
provided output and input marketing services, sometimes with a credit component, 
have been largely dismantled. This leaves a critical gap in the provision of 
agricultural marketing and associated rural services. 
Smallholder access to agricultural services (financial services, inputs, extension, 
·output marketing) is recognised as a critical factor in achieving productivity gains. 
State withdrawal puts the onus on the commercial sector to provide these services -
and there is particular interest in partnership approaches which build on the 
competences of commercial, non-governmental and public players. 
NRI has been conducting preliminary research on the conditions necessary for private 
provision of credit to small-holders. The initial research has focused on differing 
experiences from the cotton sectors in Uganda and Zimbabwe -where private cotton 
companies are involved in small-holder credit programmes - with a view to 
identifying other sectors or situations where these models could be applied. 
Uganda and Zimbabwe have both recently been through periods of market · 
liberalisation. Private companies in the cotton sectors of both countries have taken 
initiatives to provide agricultural services to cotton smallholders. The approaches 
taken in each country are markedly different, despite similarities in the problems 
faced. However, in both cases there are considerable grounds for optimism, with 
smallholder cotton production increasing, in part because of the credit schemes. These 
input credit schemes involve the provision of production inputs on credit to farmers 
by companies, which recover the loans by having exclusive purchase rights to the 
produce of those farmers. The schemes in both countries are still in their infancy, and 
questions remain over their sustainability, though they provide many lessons for the 
successful operation of input credit schemes in cotton and other sub-sectors. 
Cotton sector development in Uganda and Zimbabwe 
There are some parallels between the development of the cotton sub-sectors in 
Uganda and Zimbabwe, but also differences that help to explain the characteristics of 
the input credit schemes. 
Similarities: 
• Both Uganda and Zimbabwe have a long history of cotton production. 
• Both countries have recently liberalised their cotton sectors. Prior to 1994, state 
parastatals held monopolies on the marketing of seed cotton. Market liberalisation 
has resulted in competitive purchasing markets. 
• The market and state reforms have led to changes in local availability of inputs 
(seed, fertilisers and pesticides) for small-holders 
• The small-holder sectors of both economies are poorly served by financial 
institutions (commercial banking sector, non-governmental organisations, 
parastatals), and there is little access to credit for small-holder crop production. 
• The cotton sectors of both countries have received considerable support in recent 
years to regenerate the industries. In Zimbabwe, severe drought in 1992 had 
disastrous consequences for the whole agricultural sector. In Uganda, years of low 
state-controlled prices and voucher payments had dramatically reduced output and 
smallholder interest in growing the crop. In both cases, World Bank funds have 
been allocated to the cotton sector to aid recovery. 
Differences: 
• The structure of the agricultural sectors is different in the two countries. 
Zimbabwe has a significant large-scale commercial farming sector, accounting for 
about 1/3 of national cotton production in 1998. 
• The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe is more developed than in Uganda, with good 
infrastructure, a well developed agro-processing sector, and relatively high input 
usage. However, some of these services are geared towards the large-scale 
commercial sector, which has far higher productivity than the smallholder sector. 
• Uganda has a large number of cotton ginners (over 30), ranging from small 
operations with a single ginnery, to larger international companies with networks 
of modem ginneries. In Zimbabwe there are only three ginning companies, and 
the sector is dominated by the privatised Cotton Company of Zimbabwe. Given 
that Zimbabwe's production is also much higher than Uganda's, the structure of 
the ginning sector is considerably more concentrated in Zimbabwe. 
• In Zimbabwe, small-holder cotton production increased in importance throughout 
the 80s, whereas recovery has began in the mid-90s in Uganda. 
• Zimbabwe is a signficantly higher income country than Uganda, and commercial 
services are more developed in almost all sectors. 
Different approaches to input credit 
In both countries private companies have developed input credit schemes. The 
incentives to operate input credit schemes are similar in both countries: all companies 
are dependent to some extent on seed cotton from smallholders to maintain ginnery 
utilisation rates; excess capacity in the ginning sector gives companies an added 
reason to seek ways to secure access to smallholder seed cotton; and, the general 
paucity of production services for smallholders threatens seed cotton production. 
The input credit schemes have evolved differently, so that for the 1998/1999 season 
the schemes in the two countries have significantly contrasting approaches. The 
universal problem with input credit schemes is defaulting farmers, especially those 
who intentionally sell to an alternative buyer to escape repayment of their loan 
(known as 'side-marketing'). 
Uganda: 
The withdrawal of the state from the distribution of cottonseed for planting was 
recognised by ginners as seriously jeopardising seed cotton production, and therefore 
threatening the ginning sector. The initial reaction of one of the larger ginneries was 
to launch an ill-fated input credit scheme. The scheme proved disastrous as the 
majority of smallholders defaulted on their loans, due to a combination of side 
marketing and a poor harvest (on account of El Nino-related weather effects). 
Farmers disregarded the agreement they had entered into with the cotton company and 
sold to other ginners offering higher prices. The cotton company making the loans 
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found it impossible to enforce the purchase agreements, and attempts to seize assets 
proved unworkable. 
In order to remove the possibility of side-marketing, the Uganda Ginners and 
Exporters Association (UGEA) has been formed, with compulsory membership of all 
cotton ginners. For the 1998/1999 season the UGEA has financed the input credit 
scheme from a Bank of Uganda loan. In developing and operating the input credit 
scheme, a critical role has been played by the Cotton Development Organisation 
(CDO), a parastatal formed when the sector was liberalised, to provide co-ordination 
and regulatory services. The CDO has coordinated the distribution of cottonseed and 
pesticides. Smallholders are free to sell their seed cotton to any ginner. The ginners 
are responsible for loan repayment, and these costs are met through a levy payable 
against volumes of cotton ginned by each ginner. (Volumes are assessed by 
indepedent monitors assigned to each ginnery). Average (not individual) input costs 
will be factored into the price paid to farmers. The problem of side-marketing has 
therefore been overcome by removing the option of selling to alternative buyers: all 
ginners are members of the UGEA so it is impossible for a farmer taking credit to sell 
to buyers outside of the scheme. Levy avoidance by individual ginners has been 
reduced by the presence of monitors, and dialogue with border officials and spinning 
factories, where ginners may try to make illegal sales. 
Zimbabwe: 
Unlike Uganda, there has been no cooperation between the three ginning companies 
in Zimbabwe. Out of the three companies, two operate input credit schemes (the 
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco ), and Cotpro ). Both companies have a similar 
approach for overcoming the problem of side-marketing: 
• All borrowers belong to groups of cotton smallholders. Default by one member of 
the group brings retribution to the whole group, which may be subsequently 
excluded from the scheme. This increases incentives to repay. 
• Groups performing well receive cash rewards. 
• If defaulting occurs, the companies act swiftly and come down heavily on 
defaulters, seizing assets when necessary. 
• Local agents of the cotton companies are in year-round contact with smallholders, 
building closer relationships and a sense of loyalty to the company. 
• Additional services are provided in addition to the input credit. Extension advice 
may be provided, and the Cotton Company has recently introduced cash loans. 
Again, these additional benefits of 'belonging' to a company help to strengthen 
relationships and loyalty. 
Judging performance of input credit schemes 
Schemes in both countries are still in their infancy. In Uganda, the performance of the 
UGEA scheme cannot be fully judged because it has only been running for one 
season. 
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Judgement criteria Countries 
Zimbabwe U2anda 
Repayment Cottco: 1997 /1998 season repayment Only 50% of input loan repaid (see 
rate: 98% footnote) 
Cotpro: 1997/1998 season repayment 
rate: 100% 
Coverage For 1998/1999 season: For 1998/1999 season. 
Cottco: 48,000 smallholders Cottonseed distributed to around 
Cotpro: 5,000 smallholders 300,000 smallholder farmers, typically 
This represents about 25% of small- farming on small unirrigated plots. 
holder cotton farmers - generally The scheme is intended to reach all 
farming on communal or resettled cotton farmers (except those enrolled in 
land ( small plots, unirrigated, and a separate organic scheme) 
typically on mar_ginal land). 
Efficient use of Although no data are available, inputs Again, no data are available. However, 
inputs are likely to be used efficiently. inputs are free at the point of delivery 
• Input use is closely monitored to farmers, with the cost deducted 
and extension advice is provided. uniformly from farmgate prices -
• Farmers pay for inputs so have regardless of the volume of inputs 
good reason to use them wisely supplied to individual farmers. This 
• Inputs are supplied at cost price weakens the incentive to use inputs 
(cheaper than local market prices efficiently. To combat this, monitoring 
due to bulk buying by cotton and extension advice is provided - but 
companies and no retail margin). reports of diversion of inputs and late 
delivery were widespread. 
Subsidies Cottco: funds for the input credit UGEA uses donor funds loaned at 
scheme have come from the World below market interest rates - and the 
Bank at below market interest rates. loan is guaranteed by the Govt. 
Cotpro: partly reliant on low interest CDO do not charge for the logistics 
Agric Finance Corporation loans support provided (Govt donor funds 
used for this) 
UGEA's inability to repay loan 
amounts to 50% subsidy1 
Contribution to Small-holder credit contributes to Production credit almost certainly a 
cotton sector increased production - but significant critical component in cotton sector 
development numbers of producers do not use it recovery. UGEA plan to continue 
scheme with commercial loan and 
insurance cover. 
Wider development Potential to expand financial services Whilst cotton production may increase 
impacts available to cotton farmers (eg farmer incomes, the present input 
savings schemes) - with wider scheme does not contribute to wider 
development impacts farmer benefits relating to eg., group 
Group approach helps build capacity- building and financial 
community-level capacities discipline 
1 Repayments were calculated on a per kg of seed cotton ginned basis, and assumed an improbably 
large harvest of 150,000 bales. The use of this figure (rather than a more realistic estimate) made the 
scheme more attractive to ginners, and politically easier to sell to farmers (to the extent that they had 
any voice in this). In the event a harvest of only half this amount was achieved, with the Government 
guarantee effectively providing a 50% subsidy on the loan taken out by ginners (ie meeting half the 
repayment costs - both interest and principle). 
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Why have the schemes evolved differently? 
In Uganda the ginners decided that co-operation was needed to overcome the problem 
of side-marketing. Credit schemes implemented prior to this co-operation met with 
spectacular failure. In Zimbabwe, co-operation between the cotton companies has not 
proved essential. (With a small number of large companies it seems that individual 
companies feel they have more to lose than gain from co-operation). Instead, a set of 
other mechanisms has been developed for the successful operation of the schemes. 
The development of the credit schemes has been affected by various factors: 
• The Cottco scheme in Zimbabwe started prior to liberalisation, when the parastatal 
(Cottco's predecessor) still operated a crop purchase monopoly. Farmers 
participated in the scheme for two years before liberalisation, and this may have 
contributed to the successful continuation of the scheme when new companies 
entered the market. (There were initial problems with default immediately after 
liberalisation, but Cottco moved quickly to tighten up procedures). 
• Financial discipline appears to be stronger in rural Zimbabwe, with farmers 
increasingly recognising the obligation to repay loans. Asset seizure in Zimbabwe 
has the desired effect of forcing people to repay, whilst in Uganda it has caused 
outrage and soured relationships between ginners and farmers. In U ga:nda, there 
has perhaps been more recent experience and expectation of loan amnesties, and 
weak follow-up by NGOs and state lenders (whose credit programmes ran at a 
loss). In addition, it was politically difficult to enforce loan repayment given that 
the poor harvest was largely attributable to extreme weather conditions.· 
• The use of groups in Zimbabwe has been beneficial to the input credit schemes. In 
Uganda there appears to be general scepticism towards groups, possibly due to 
bad experiences in the past. The capacity to run and faciliate such groups is 
almost certainly weaker in Uganda at the present time. 
• The Zimbabwe schemes involve many incentives for good performance. Perhaps 
the greatest incentive is the opportunity to remain in the input credit schemes, 
which implies that they recognise the benefit of access to inputs. In Uganda, 
farmers rarely use fertilisers, and even pesticide use in cotton cultivation is not 
universal. They may perceive less benefit from participation in input credit 
schemes -hence the ginners' stop-gap measure of (effectively) compulsory 
participation (ie input charges are factored into seed cotton prices, regardless of 
participation). 
Co-operation between ginners in Uganda may be possible because of the fairly level 
playing field they face. In Zimbabwe, Cottco effectively has a head start over the 
other ginners - and stands to gain little from sharing information with the others 
(though, of course, the latecomers would benefit from the information Cottco has on 
the credit and production records of individual farmers). 
Moreover the UGEA mechanism in Uganda may be appropriate there because it is 
less demanding of skills and experience in providing services to small-holders. A 
group approach, for instance, would call for rapid learning on the part of the ginning 
companies, and co-operation with the stretched public and NGO services available in 
rural areas to facilitate and train groups. The relatively recent history of loan 
amnesties and opportunities for strategic default (intentional default, unlikely to 
jeopardise future income or access to services) would almost certainly exacerbate loan 
5 
repayment. The UGEA mechanism could therefore be viewed as an imperfect 
pragmatic response to an immediate need to provide inputs to fanners, without which 
there would be little cotton production, and the newly rehabilitated ginneries would be 
uneconomic. Whether it proves effective in this will depend on the ability of CDO 
and the ginners to reduce input leakage and diversion to acceptable levels, and to 
make timely deliveries of appropriate inputs (such that the benefits seen in cotton 
production do indeed exceed the costs of the scheme). 
Although co-operation can be used to combat side-marketing, it also has some 
drawbacks. Cooperation dampens incentives for the individual ginners to provide 
additional services.to fanners, for instance extension advice, as fanners have no 
commitment to sell to a specific ginner. However, it may be possible for the ginners 
to provide cotton extension services collectively- and in so doing, realise certain 
economies of scale too. However, ginners do stand to benefit from creating close 
relationships with growers, and although there is no evidence of it yet, theoretically 
ginners could compete on additional service provision as well as on price. 
Lessons from these experiences 
There has been a steady increase in smallholder seed cotton production in Zimbabwe 
during the period the schemes have been operating. The data from Uganda is more 
difficult to interpret. The 1998/99 harvest (approximately 80,000 bales of cotton lint) 
exceeded the previous El Nino harvest (32,000 bales), but did not reach the levels 
achieved in 1996/97 (110,000 bales). The scheme has reached large numbers of 
fanners in Uganda- but there were complaints of late delivery, and diversion of 
inputs to other uses, markets and farmers. Interestingly, however, the ginners have 
put their faith (and money) in the scheme, which they plan to continue in 1999/2000 
at higher cost with commercial loans. In Zimbabwe, the Cotton Company is the 
largest provider of credit to smallholders - far larger than the parastatal Agricultural 
Finance Corporation. 
It is useful to summarise the conditions that are conducive to the development of input 
credit schemes in which repayment is linked to output marketing. 
Incentives 
Companies providing credit will recognise the risks and costs involved. These will 
vary depending on the production and market conditions pertaining to individual 
crops, and other factors relating to company presence in rural areas, the development 
of other rural services and capacities, and farmer .experience of other credit schemes. 
Companies will have an incentive to provide credit if the benefits outweigh the costs. 
Examples may include situations where: 
• the trade is particularly profitable, making it worthwhile to assure supply sources 
and bear some risk (high value horticultural exports, for instance) 
• there is a need to assure supplies to maintain plant utilisation at economic levels 
(cotton ginneries, for example) 
• more assured supplies will help reduce other risks or costs faced by the buyer (by 
increasing market share, for instance) 
• farmers have no other means by which to produce the desired crop 
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Farmers participating in such schemes risk indebtedness or asset seizure, and will be 
locked into sales agreements. Their willingness to participate will be partly 
dependent on: 
• a clear understanding of the potential benefits of participation 
• the desirability of securing market access 
• inability to acquire necessary inputs from other sources or by other means 
• the package of benefits on offer (for instance, inputs, transport, extension) 
• the terms on which production credit is offered (input and output prices, and 
interest rate) 
• the associated transaction costs (for instance, time spent travelling or in meetings, 
filling out forms) and skills required (eg., book-keeping) 
Unfortunately farmers may also be willing to participate if they perceive potential for 
strategic default. The onus is on the provider to anticipate situations in which this 
might arise (for instance, where a crop can be consumed on-farm or marketed 
locally), to put the necessary mechanisms in place to avoid it (see below), and to 
make sure that farmers are aware that strategic default will not be possible. 
Means 
Companies operating input credit schemes need access to funds to finance the 
schemes. Operation of large-scale input credit schemes requires a considerable outlay 
over several months or a year (or even longer with perennial crops or livestock). 
Commercial banking sectors in both Uganda and Zimbabwe are reluctant to provide 
financing for small-holder agricultural activity (though there are some promising pilot 
projects developing more robust methodologies for lending to small-holders). In the 
cotton sectors in both countries, use has been made of international donor funds, but 
this avenue may not be available to smaller private companies (unless they co-
operate, as has happened in Uganda). Larger companies may be able to use their own 
funds. 
Mechanisms 
The experience in cotton demonstrates the variety of mechanisms that may be used to 
operate and strengthen input credit schemes which link repayment to crop purchase: 
• co-operation between buyers 
• group lending 
• close monitoring 
• extension services 
• developing good company-farmer relations 
• offering incentives for repayment 
• strict treatment of defaulters (asset seizure, legal action, group penalties) 
• lending "in-kind" to reduce diversion of inputs to other uses 
• policing potential "leakages" (crops being sold across borders for instance, or 
inputs being sold in local markets) 
The appropriate mix of mechanisms depends on the characteristics of the commodity 
sub-sector (for instance, the alternative outlets or uses for the output), the level of 
financial discipline of small-holders, and the presence of supporting institutions (such 
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as a central co-ordinating authority, extension services, and experienced facilitators of 
farmer groups). 
Clearly applications to other sectors and country situations would require careful 
appraisal, but the experiences in the cotton sectors in Zimbabwe and Uganda provide 
some very useful pointers on enabling conditions and approaches appropriate to 
particular circumstances. 
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